

# ReSAKSS

Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System

Facilitated by IFPRI 

## SWAZILAND



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Capacity  
Strengthening  
Strategy through  
Capacity Needs  
Assessment for  
Country Level  
Strategic Analysis  
and Knowledge  
Support System  
(SAKSS)

# SWAZILAND

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## Capacity Strengthening Strategy through Capacity Needs Assessment for Country Level Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (SAKSS)

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*Disclaimer:*

*The opinions expressed in this report are those of the consultants; they do not represent the views of the Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System or the International Water Management Institute.*

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This capacity needs assessment is the brainchild of the Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (ReSAKSS) and the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). The study was undertaken to collect data from key institutions in Swaziland involved in food and agriculture policy processes; the data so collected are expected to inform the subsequent capacity development strategy for Swaziland that will address the needs of its Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) and the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) implementation processes—that is, the study is conducted in the context of contributing to the CAADP process involving the establishment of a strategic analysis and knowledge support system.

The study was undertaken at three levels—policy, organizational, and individual—with the thematic areas of concern for the capacity needs assessment being (1) strategic policy analysis, (2) monitoring and evaluation (M&E), and (3) knowledge management and sharing. The study was operationalized through interviews with key informants in different organizations using a ReSAKSS questionnaire. Initially, 24 organizations were identified for the study. Unfortunately, only 9 responded positively. These organizations were the Department of Veterinary and Livestock Services (DVS), the Department of Agriculture and Extension, the Department of Research and Specialist Services (DRSS), the National Maize Corporation, the Central Bank of Swaziland, the Swaziland Economic Policy Analysis and Research Centre (SEPARC), TechnoServe, and the Swaziland National Agricultural Union (SNAU). The following is a summary of the study's major outputs.

### Policy-level capacity analysis

The analysis revealed that the many existing agriculture policies are not adequate to deal with the many problems, constraints, and challenges that the sector faces. The latter include low productivity, climate change and variability, globalization, and loss of its US African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) eligibility, to mention a few. Second, the country lacks an overarching agriculture-sector development policy and strategy that would coordinate and address needs as well as deliver improved productivity, exports, and employment. The present pool of policies and strategies is not sufficient to provide the expected guidance on food and agriculture policy. The study recommends that MoA develop a new national agriculture-sector policy to replace the 2005 Comprehensive Agricultural Sector Policy. Current MoA policies need to be revisited, and implementation plans as well as M&E mechanisms put in place; those that may be irrelevant should be repealed or eliminated.

Agriculture stakeholders at the 2007 Swaziland National Agriculture Summit (NAS) raised the issue that food and agriculture policy processes were the exclusive responsibility of government technical officers and rarely involved stakeholder participation. Participation, participants concluded, was merely consultative, and in the end, policy products did not necessarily reflect stakeholder needs. As late as 2015, a joint sector review concluded that even after NAS, the government's responsiveness and sense of urgency to achieve particular programme success had been modest, possibly due weak coherence (ReSAKSS-SA 2015). The diverse nature of agricultural stakeholders in the country, each with a different agenda, prevents smooth policy development. Apathy towards agriculture policy development and implementation is omnipresent, the joint sector review concluded, and stakeholders hold the perception that MoA desires not genuine participation but a rubber-stamping process. The need to improve the effectiveness of participation, implementation, and evaluation of policies was clearly seen as highly desirable (ReSAKSS-SA 2015).

Agriculture policy development in the ministry has improved, becoming increasingly more participatory than in the past. Participants, however, remain apathetic and do not believe in MoA's sincerity (ReSAKSS-SA 2015). As a secondary issue, M&E in the ministry is weak. Its presence and efficacy have experienced a constant decline since the 1990s. The Ministry of Economic Planning and Development is responsible for M&E in MoA, but this function and the sense of responsibility for it have waned. Lack of resources is a major cause for the collapse of the M&E service. MoA regularly reports to the Cabinet and Parliament on progress being made on different projects, but this information is not available to the public, and hence the extent to which policies are monitored in

the ministry remains modest. DVS is the exception and is to be commended for keeping records according to the requirements of the Livestock Identification Act.

The key issue emanating from the organization-level analysis is that although there are many agriculture policies, they are not adequate to deal with the multiple problems, constraints, and challenges that the sector faces on a day-to-day basis, including low productivity, climate change and variability, globalization, loss of AGOA eligibility, and so on. Worse still, the sector lacks an overarching development policy and strategy that would coordinate and address needs and deliver improved productivity, exports, employment, and the like.

MoA should evolve a new national agriculture-sector policy to complement the CAADP process. Policies need to be revisited and implementation plans as well as M&E mechanisms put in place. Stakeholder participation should be promoted and appreciated, and issues warranting policies should be intensively debated until consensus is reached. SNAU could form the basis for an institutional stakeholder platform.

The recent joint sector review report (ReSAKSS-SA 2015) revealed that apathy is still rife among stakeholders. They continue to shun meetings, feeling that their contributions are likely to be ignored anyway because high-level government officials keep the agenda, know what the meeting is expected to achieve, and have final responsibility. Civil servants therefore need to change their attitude towards farmers and other stakeholders.

## Organization-level capacity analysis

The organization-level analysis was based on an organization-level questionnaire consisting of 5 domains and 19 questions. The 5 domains represented the core capabilities of organizations, ranging from leadership to strategy coherence. The questionnaire asked for responses on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 representing high effectiveness or strong agreement, on statements relating to the institution's core capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses.

On the domain or core capability to act and commit, respondents seemed apprehensive, with an overall response of 2.9 and mean scores varying between 2.9 and 3.3, suggesting average to limited strategic abilities in the country's institutions. The leadership in non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and government institutions was judged to be, overall, average in effectiveness (2.5–2.8). Effective M&E management recorded an overall response of 2.0 and a range between 2.0 and 3.0, suggesting that respondents felt M&E management is, at best, less than effective, probably because it is not well institutionalized in the different organizations for one reason or another. The analysis of capability to deliver on mandates recorded strong positive responses, averaging 2.0 and with a range of 1.0 to 2.4, but with government institutions garnering the highest numerical scores (that is, perceived as the least effective). The fourth core capability, to coordinate and relate—that is, the level of engagement in networks and the like—averaged 1.9, suggesting effective capacity to establish and maintain relationships, with NGOs and parastatal bodies seen as having the most capability in this domain. Finally, the core capability to achieve policy and strategy goals had an average response of 1.7, suggesting a positive state of policy and strategic coherence, but again, with government organizations judged more harshly.

To explain these observations, further analysis revealed that overall organizational staff satisfaction was low, owing to different government regulations and fairly high staff turnover levels due to limited incentives and the impermanence of positions. These factors constrain both capacity and institutional memory. Second, funding is a major bottleneck for policy implementation and strategic planning; funding to support operations and purchase tools and equipment, including computer hardware and software, is limited. This weakness is exacerbated by a lack of knowledge and skills in data collection, analysis, interpretation, and reporting. Third, although many organizations compile statistical reports and other performance reports in accordance with regulations, these reports are not open to the public for information or scrutiny. Formal public-private dialogues, as well as information, communication, and knowledge management, are practically non-existent. Infrastructure to facilitate information exchange in MoA is too old to achieve that purpose. Finally, in the entire ministry, M&E is conducted only by DVS; other MoA departments lack this structure. Inactivity in the Central Statistical Office, whose mandate is to generate agriculture data, only makes the M&E situation worse. The M&E database thus has little influence on strategic planning, and individual institutional or government analyses are required to ascertain the unique features of each organization.

## Individual-level capacity assessments

The individual-level assessments revealed, in general, that the quality of human capacity is a major constraint in all organizations, exacerbated by the rather limited number and often temporary posting of professionals in the organizations tasked with food and agriculture policy. Besides the understaffing in the professional cadres, staff retention is difficult, leading to high turnover (attrition) of human resources. Though we gathered limited information on policymaking capacity, organizations do willingly participate in the country's policymaking and implementing processes.

Government departments largely depend on the national budget to execute their programmes and plans related to food and agriculture policies. These funds come in the form of recurrent budgets wherein all expenditures are based on specific line items. Financial regulations deter the transfer of funds across line items by requiring lengthy treasury negotiations. The budget for capital development is limited and, again, allocated for specific items or projects. In essence, policy issues do not have specific budget line items, and therefore implementing departments have to seek funding from elsewhere. Parastatal bodies are better placed to conduct food and agriculture policy-related activities. The large parastatal bodies generate sufficient funds to support such activities, but the smaller bodies (such as the Swaziland Cotton Board and SEPARC) do not have this luxury because they continue to draw support from the government.

Most organizations (if not all) lack or have limited capacity in terms of computer software and hardware. Where such resources do exist, they are likely to be old, outdated, and often obsolete so that new editions of current software programs cannot be used. This is largely the case in MoA departments, where a computer, if operating, is shared by different staff members, each for a different purpose. DRSS depends on the age-old MSTAT-C statistical analytical program, which is more than 20 years old, and those involved in social research have to depend on SPSS Statistics software at the Government Computer Services Department for support.

M&E is weak in MoA. The Economic Planning and Analysis Section, responsible for this exercise, has long ceased conducting this function. The only MoA department with a reliable M&E system is DVS. Hence, policy implementation is rarely monitored and evaluated except in DVS. The parastatal bodies and NGOs, on the other hand, have in place sufficiently elaborate infrastructure to monitor and evaluate their programmes. A major reason for this success is that their principals require regular M&E reporting.

The quality and quantity of human capital for policy research using analytical software, data entry, and data analysis is very limited, as indeed are funds to carry out such activities. However, there are regional and international research-policy linkages with UN agencies, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and with various CGIAR centres such as the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT) and the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture, as well as CGIAR's Audit and Risk Committee.

Finally, many institutions lack sufficient physical office space to facilitate operations. The infrastructure of DRSS, for instance, is dilapidated and does not provide much confidence in its products.

## Knowledge management

Knowledge management promotes an integrated approach to identifying, capturing, evaluating, retrieving, and sharing an organization's information assets. These assets may include databases, documents, policies, procedures, and previously uncaptured expertise and experience in individual workers. The Swaziland National Agricultural Investment Plan observed that the underdevelopment of the agriculture sector was in part "also" due to poor information management; proper information management, the document added, is a cornerstone in the M&E of progress in agricultural development and for subsequent reporting to the local and international communities (Swaziland, MoA 2014).

MoA lacks an integrated agricultural information system. The elaborate agricultural information system established in the 1980s deteriorated as budgetary support declined, eventually becoming little more than a photocopy shop. The major challenges in the use of the different communication approaches to knowledge management are availability of staff (quality and numbers); access to reporting and analytical facilities as well as financing to support these activities; and lack of physical capacity to process, disseminate, and distribute findings. These challenges need to be addressed to facilitate the systematic capturing, processing, disseminating, and sharing of knowledge in order to make it productive and usable. It is thus critical to initiate training programmes in knowledge management and obtain the requisite software, hardware, and physical assets.

## Capacity needs strengthening issues

This study identified several areas in need of attention to ensure the quality, utility, and content of food and agriculture policy development, investment planning, M&E, and knowledge management:

1. Funding is a major concern because all subsequent activities depend on finance. Public-sector funding is itemized, and financial regulations prohibit the transfer of funds from one agency or centre to another. The same may be said of funding from NGOs and parastatal bodies. Without additional and unattached funding, food and agriculture policy development will remain either in abeyance or at low levels of activity.
2. Organizations lack pools of professional staff that can be readily or permanently deployed to policy analysis, investment planning, M&E, and knowledge management. The limited number of professional staff members in any given organization have their own mundane responsibilities. In any case, even when available staff members are deployed on the issues of food and agriculture development, they are likely to lack the necessary capacity, skills, and knowledge to handle data collection, analysis, and reporting. This issue will no doubt constrain the use of evidence-based analysis to set priorities.
3. Within MoA, the tracking of sector performance is adequate only for livestock. For the other subsectors, M&E is largely absent, making it difficult to generate the necessary evidence for use in food and agriculture policy research. MoA needs to revive its previous structures and incorporate the M&E portfolio, whose absence is proving detrimental to MoA operations.
4. Most institutions surveyed lack suitable physical facilities, including computer hardware and software, office space, and other tools and equipment. This issue is critical given the state of various tools, equipment, software, and hardware (old and obsolete). Success will come only when these shortcomings are addressed.
5. Knowledge management and information exchange are little known in the different organizations. The elaborate agricultural information system established in MoA in the 1980s deteriorated and ultimately degenerated into a photocopying shop. These facilities need to be re-established and the necessary capacity developed if information/knowledge management is to be effective and progress in M&E achieved (Swaziland, MoA 2014).
6. SNAU is attempting to build the capacity of farmers to understand and participate in policy dialogue. These attempts need to be embraced to ensure that the main stakeholder and recipient of agricultural outputs is well versed in policies and investment planning.

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## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACAT	Africa Cooperative Action Trust
AGC	Attorney General's Chambers
AgGDP	Agricultural Gross Domestic Product
AGOA	US African Growth and Opportunity Act
ARC	Agricultural Research Corporation
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
CASP	Comprehensive Agricultural Sector Policy
CBO	Community-Based Organization
CIMMYT	International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center
DAE	Department of Agriculture and Extension (MoA)
DRSS	Department of Research and Specialist Services (MoA)
DVS	Department of Veterinary and Livestock Services (MoA)
E	Swazi emalangeni
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GIS	Geographic Information System
ICRISAT	International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-arid Tropics
ICT	Information and Communications Technologies
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IITA	International Institute of Tropical Agriculture
KDDP	Komati Downstream Development Project
LUSIP	Lower Usuthu Smallholder Irrigation Project
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MEPD	Ministry of Economic Planning and Development
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture
NAMBoard	National Agricultural Marketing Board
NARS	National Agricultural Research System
NAS	National Agriculture Summit (2007)
NDS	National Development Strategy
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development

NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NMC	National Maize Corporation
PRSAP	Poverty Reduction Strategy and Action Plan
RDA	Rural Development Area
ReSAKSS	Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System
SACAU	Southern African Confederation of Agricultural Unions
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAKSS	Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System
SEPARC	Swaziland Economic Policy Analysis and Research Centre
SLITS	Swaziland Livestock Information and Traceability System
SNAIP	Swaziland National Agricultural Investment Plan
SNARA	Swaziland National Agricultural Research Authority
SNAU	Swaziland National Agricultural Union
SNL	Swazi Nation land
SWADE	Swaziland Water and Agricultural Development Enterprise
Swazi-SAKSS	Swaziland Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System
TDL	Title Deed Land
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNISWA	University of Swaziland

# 1. INTRODUCTION

## 1.1. Background on Swaziland's agriculture sector

Swaziland has a largely agriculture-based economy. More than 75 per cent of the population resides in rural areas and depends on the agriculture sector for its livelihoods and as a source of food and income (Central Bank of Swaziland 2013). The sector consists of four major components: crops (usually grown through small-scale agriculture on Swazi Nation land [SNL] and large-scale farming on title deed land [TDL]),<sup>1</sup> livestock, forestry, and fisheries (the latter insignificant in its contribution). Of these subsectors, TDL farming's contributions to real agricultural gross domestic product (AgGDP) varied between 800 million Swazi emalangeni (E) and E1.1 billion between 2000 and 2012; the contributions of SNL farming, livestock, and forestry were marginal, ranging between E80 million and E120 million (Central Bank of Swaziland 2012). Overall, the crops subsector had the largest share in total AgGDP, with contributions of more than 80 per cent.

At the household level, income accrues from different sources, including (1) sales of farm produce; (2) employment within communities; (3) employment in large estates, plantations, and livestock ranches; and (4) employment in agriculture-based manufacturing firms and processors. Thus, agriculture remains key to the livelihoods of the largest segment of the population. Issues pertaining to food and nutrition security and poverty reduction are, in turn, directly associated with the agriculture sector.

Issues of poverty and of food security and access are well enunciated in the National Development Strategy (NDS) (Swaziland, MoEPD 1999). The Poverty Reduction Strategy and Action Plan (PRSAP) likewise states, "food security is a basic human right ... achieved when all people at all times, have ... access to sufficient amounts of quality food ... for an active and healthy life"; furthermore, the government, the plan states, must pursue food security because nearly 70 per cent of the population "is still food insecure" (Swaziland, PRTF 2005, 80).

The National Food Security Policy (Swaziland, MoAC 2005), itself seen as augmenting the Comprehensive Agricultural Sector Policy (CASP) (Swaziland, MoA 2005) and the NDS (Swaziland, MoEPD 1999), aims at addressing the threats and opportunities relating to food security in Swaziland. Such threats and challenges include declining economic performance and, with it, reduced budgetary allocation to the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), in turn leading to declining support to farming communities from service providers. Climate and weather changes and variability threaten to destroy agricultural operations, crops, and livestock farming and dry up water sources on which the economy so much depends for development. Land degradation is yet another challenge stemming from land abuse, the growing population, and with it, rising demand for more land for farming purposes and township developments; grazing to support the ever-rising number of ruminants, especially on SNL; and lack of an enabling land policy and land governance guidelines. At the household level, poverty can prevent a household from purchasing improved agricultural inputs or adopting them in sufficient quantities for planned cropping areas; as a result, production remains low. Food insecurity then arises because the limited volume of inputs purchased will be spread thinly over larger areas; moreover, households often resort to the use of traditional inputs (Pali-Shikhulu 201).

Thus, despite the level of focus on food security at the national and sectoral levels, Swaziland has not been very successful in achieving food security and access for all of its citizens. Imports are made every year to stem the shortfall in production. The 2012/2013 season, for example, although recording higher production—84,000 metric tons as compared with the previous season's 76,000 metric tons—still did not produce enough to satisfy the local demand of 115,000 metric tons, making Swaziland a continuing net importer of maize and other cereals to address the shortfall. Indeed, the National Maize Corporation (NMC) imported more than 20,000 metric tons of maize that year (Central Bank of Swaziland 2013).

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<sup>1</sup> SNL is communal land whose usufruct rights are allocated at the local level. TDL is individually or corporately owned.

Swaziland has not been able to produce enough food to cover its requirements even though more than 75 per cent of its population resides in rural areas and derives its livelihoods through crop and livestock production. The major causes for this shortfall are (1) poverty and the lack of financing to access the required inputs; (2) low access to and use of research and extension services; (3) constraints on access to yield-enhancing inputs such as farm power, good-quality seed, and fertilizers; (4) dependence on rain-fed agriculture; (5) limited agricultural skills, which cumulatively lead to reduced production; and (6) lack of supportive policies for trade in agricultural inputs and marketing operations (Pali-Shikhulu 2014).

Establishing the necessary policy environments, though desirable, does not in itself guarantee success. Human and institutional capacity to support the implementation and monitoring of such policies becomes critical. According to Sanyal and Babu (2010), the strengthening of individual and institutional capacity for agricultural development has to encompass a range of personnel in the public and private sectors and at the farmer level. Thus, human resource development is key to strengthening capacity for rural development just as adequate policy analysis and research capacity remain critical for the development of effective strategies, policies, and programmes.

## 1.2. Background of the Study

Swaziland signed its Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) compact in 2010 (Swaziland, MoA 2010) and developed the Swaziland National Agricultural Investment Plan (SNAIP) (Swaziland, MoA 2014) in 2015. The Swaziland CAADP compact is a high-level agreement between the government of Swaziland and various stakeholders including regional representatives, civil society organizations, the private sector, farmers' organizations, and development partners. It outlines programmes and projects required to transform the agriculture sector to achieve the stipulated minimum 6 per cent annual agricultural growth rate, with spending targets set for at least 10 per cent of the national budget (Swaziland, MoA 2010). The SNAIP is a 10-year investment plan (2015–2025) that identifies and prioritizes key investments as well as institutional and policy changes that are critical to achieving the agricultural productivity growth and development targets. Swaziland has thus embraced the CAADP process as pivotal to its development efforts and as likely to add value to efforts to improve the performance of the agriculture sector. The country expects to achieve this improved performance through effective coordination and adoption of evidence-based planning and implementation processes in all associated sectors. CAADP has pledged to help the country “define a coherent long-term development and investment framework that will guide the planning and implementation of current and future interventions for agricultural development” and help it identify “strategic options to directly address poverty reduction” (Swaziland, MoA 2010, 4–5).

A major requirement for the successful implementation of CAADP and attainment of its goals and strategies at the country level is the continual generation of evidence to facilitate the design, implementation, and adjustment of programmes and interventions as found necessary. The CAADP compact assigns MoA and the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development (MEPD) as hosts for this function, with the National Medium-Term Investment Programme responsible for monitoring. This arrangement, however, is likely to be ineffective. According to the CAADP framework, a country Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (SAKSS) node is the preferred route to undertake such an assignment. A SAKSS unit would have the mandate to focus on Swaziland's specific analytical and capacity needs and, in collaboration with the Regional SAKSS (ReSAKSS), would do the following:

- Ensure a stronger and more integrated knowledge support system for purposes of undertaking evidence-based agricultural policy analysis, planning and implementation, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E)
- Foster capacity development through trainings in policy analysis at the country level
- Generate actionable policy research for filling knowledge gaps to strengthen policy implementation
- Facilitate policy dialogues between diverse stakeholders
- Provide direct input into agricultural development planning

The CAADP agenda focuses on improving the quality of policy and strategic planning and implementation with a view to accelerating growth and progress towards poverty reduction and food and nutrition security. Achievement of these target areas requires human, institutional, and physical capacities; analytical tools; and information to generate credible, timely, and high-quality knowledge products that inform and guide agriculture-sector policies, including planning and reviewing processes. In Swaziland, the capacities to generate evidence-based information, perform M&E, manage knowledge, and effectively communicate information and knowledge to policymakers, thus promoting policy dialogue, may not be sufficiently developed. Hence, the need is urgent to understand the human, institutional, and physical needs of the Swaziland agriculture sector within the framework for advancing the CAADP agenda at the country level. The key questions to be addressed around capacity needs assessment and capacity development include these:

1. What are the country-specific needs for strategic agricultural policy analysis and investment planning, M&E, and knowledge management?
2. What individual and organizational capacities are needed for strategic agricultural policy analysis and investment planning, M&E, and knowledge management in the short, medium, and long term to satisfy those needs?
3. How can these capacities be harnessed through their effective use in the organizations involved in the CAADP process, particularly for strategic agricultural policy analysis and investment planning, M&E, and knowledge management?
4. What institutional and capacity constraints in the policy process hinder the policy organizations from playing their role effectively to meet the objectives of CAADP?
5. How can such capacity gaps be identified and addressed?

Responses to these questions through capacity needs assessments and a capacity-strengthening strategy are critical for customizing the SAKSS concept to the local context. Based on this background, this study focuses on undertaking a capacity needs assessment for a Swaziland SAKSS (Swazi-SAKSS) and developing a capacity-strengthening strategy.

### 1.3. Purpose and objectives of the study

The purpose of this country-level capacity needs assessment is to develop a country-specific capacity-strengthening strategy to meet the strategic analysis and knowledge management objectives of the country CAADP process.

The specific objective of the capacity needs assessment is to **identify gaps and hence areas for improving the quality and utility of agricultural policy analysis, investment planning and implementation, M&E, and knowledge management at the country level.**

The findings of the study will inform the design and establishment of Swazi-SAKSS.

## 1.4. Context, levels, and themes

This study was undertaken in the context of contributing to the CAADP process that would ultimately lead to the establishment of Swazi-SAKSS. The capacity needs assessment was undertaken at three levels:

1. Policy processes
2. Organization
3. Individual

The needs assessment covers evidence generation through the following specific thematic areas to assist in the CAADP implementation process:

1. Strategic policy analysis and investment planning
2. M&E
3. Knowledge management and information sharing at the country level

Assessing the capacity for strategic policy analysis and investment planning involved looking at the specific research and analytical skills required to generate evidence, including skills for data generation and processing, analysis of policy alternatives, and impact assessment of the policies and programmes that are implemented as part of the CAADP process.

Assessing the capacity of M&E systems involved identifying M&E systems that are in place as well as what is needed to strengthen them and improve their synergy to provide sufficient data for producing periodic reports on the performance of the agriculture sector at the country level, for example through the flagship Agricultural Trends and Outlook Reports from ReSAKSS. This work included but was not limited to assessing the following:

1. Indicators (definitions and measurements) for tracking agriculture and rural development policy and planning processes and funding, monitoring performance in the agriculture and rural sectors, and monitoring changes in development outcomes (such as poverty, food and nutrition security, and hunger)
2. Data sources for these indicators, including instruments and tools
3. Regularity of data collection and reporting on indicators
4. Data, knowledge management, and analytical tools
5. Availability of data, tools, and reports, including those targeted to specific populations
6. Integration of the different data and M&E systems for monitoring and reporting on overall national growth and development objectives and for assessing the impact of policies and programmes on these objectives

Assessing the capacity for knowledge management and information sharing involved looking at systems for storing and managing data and for communicating information using different knowledge products and channels to target different audiences.

Strengthening the capacity of the policy process would thus identify opportunities for motivating policy decision makers to demand policy analysis outputs and put them to effective use. Although the policy process differs from country to country depending on the nature of leadership and governance, the researchers invoked an ongoing agricultural research transformation exercise to identify key players and actors, their roles, and their influence, and to identify opportunities for strengthening the policy processes for effective implementation of CAADP investment plans. Strengthening agricultural research is a key component of pillar 4 of the investment plan.

## 1.5. Structure of the report

This report consists of five chapters. Following the executive summary, Chapter 1 provides the context for the study and background in light of CAADP and the newly completed SNAIP. Chapter 2 discusses the methodology adopted to operationalize the study. Chapter 3 describes the major findings for the different organizations that agreed to participate in the study, organized at the policy, institutional, and individual levels. Issues arising at each level of analysis are summarized. Chapters 4 and 5 analyse data on investment planning and knowledge management, respectively, summarizing with pertinent recommendations. Finally, Chapter 6 assesses and presents proposals for capacity strengthening. The report ends with conclusions and recommendations (Chapter 7).

## 1.6. Deliverables and timelines

The main deliverable of this exercise is a comprehensive, peer-reviewed ReSAKSS working paper on the country-level capacity-strengthening strategy based on the capacity needs assessment. The working paper will contain three major elements:

- 1. Needs assessment report:** The needs assessment component will be completed within three months of the researchers' signing the contract. Needs will be assessed in the following areas: strategic policy analysis and investment planning, M&E, and knowledge management and information sharing.
- 2. Baseline database for capacity M&E:** A major output of the capacity needs assessment exercise is the development of a baseline database that can be tracked and monitored in the study country. The capacity development strategy will take into account both existing capacity and the level of capacity needed to support the database. This deliverable is due within a month of completion of the needs assessment report.
- 3. Capacity-strengthening strategy and full report:** Within a month after completion of the needs assessment, the capacity-strengthening strategy will be developed and incorporated into the full report. The full report will contain all of the above elements as well as an introductory section, a methodological section, and a concluding section.

## 2. METHODOLOGY

### 2.1. Capacity Needs Assessment

This study employed the methodology presented in the terms of reference (ToR, found in Appendix 1). It considered three levels of analysis: the policy process level, the institution level, and the individual level. Data, both qualitative and quantitative, were collected through key informant interviews of selected stakeholders involved in agricultural policy processes, a questionnaire that was pretested and validated in previous studies carried out in other CAADP member countries, and a literature review for secondary data.

#### 2.1.1. Policy Process Level

Information relating to policy-level processes was divided into different topics, including agricultural policy formulation, implementation, M&E, and the application of M&E. Key stakeholders were individually selected based on the available literature and their observed participation at different stages of the policy process. They represented the public sector (that is, government), the private sector, farmers’ organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the University of Swaziland, and research organizations.

Before commencing this assignment, it was extremely important to seek permission from the principal secretary of MoA for a study of this nature to proceed. Matters of policy discussion and dialogue create fear among respondents, so it was hoped that clearance from the principal secretary would allay such fears. The clearance was obtained (Appendix 3).

Researchers distributed questionnaires (Appendix 2) and scheduled key informant interviews with the selected stakeholders and institutions. They met with the key informants, partly to discuss their understanding of the instrument and partly to develop amicable rapport. Following these discussions with each key informant (mostly directors and chief executive officers of organizations), the instrument was left for further processing because many sections involved different units in any given organization.

Despite multiple efforts to contact stakeholders by phone and email, response was very slow; the key stakeholders in each of the institutions of the agriculture sector were always too busy to attend to our study. The few key informants who successfully participated in this study are listed in Table 2.1.

**TABLE 2.1 LIST AND ROLES OF STAKEHOLDERS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE SURVEY**

Category	Institution	Role
<b>Government</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ministry of Agriculture</li> </ul>	The major role of the ministry departments is to engage stakeholders in planning, formulating, monitoring and evaluation, and use of feedback to update agricultural policy on behalf of the government.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Department of Veterinary and Livestock Services</li> </ul>	DVS’s mandate is to prevent the spread of animal diseases and zoonoses, promote animal health and welfare, and equip livestock producers with adequate knowledge, skill, and technical know-how on the efficient management of all resources that will ensure profitable returns and an efficient and sustainable livestock industry.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Department of Agriculture and Extension</li> </ul>	

Category	Institution	Role
<b>Government</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Department of Research and Specialist Services</li> </ul>	<p>Extension mainly provides advisory services to farmers and facilitates feedback from the field, including agricultural surveys.</p> <p>This department's role is mainly to carry out primary research, providing empirical evidence to inform policy analysis related to agriculture.</p>
<b>Independent-governmental organizations (parastatal bodies)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>National Maize Corporation (NMC)</li> <li>Central Bank of Swaziland</li> <li>Swaziland Economic Policy Analysis and Research Centre (SEPARC)</li> </ul>	<p>NMC is a government entity directly mandated to coordinate maize, cereal, and other grain markets; generate data; and publish reports on cereal and grain markets in Swaziland. The information generated is important in formulating and updating Swaziland food and agricultural policies, especially on grains and cereals.</p> <p>The bank is responsible for compiling information related to agriculture-sector performance at both the macro and micro levels, consolidating budgets for different public agricultural projects, and ensuring that funds are available. The bank's research unit generates data and makes them available in public reports.</p> <p>SEPARC is a parastatal created in 2007 through a grant of US\$1.8 million (a joint collaboration between the African Capacity Building Foundation [ACBF] and the Government of the Kingdom Swaziland) in response to the need for more effective, well-informed policies and management of the economy. SEPARC supports various aspects of economic policy formulation and implementation, as well as the private sector and civil society.</p> <p>The goal of SEPARC is to build sustainable national capacity in order to improve the quality and timeliness of public policies in Swaziland through establishing a semi-autonomous economic policy and research centre, conducting research in areas of policy formulation and management, providing training and policy advice to government officials, and promoting policy dialogue within Swaziland through dissemination workshops, conferences, and publications.</p>

Category	Institution	Role
<b>Non-governmental organizations</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>TechnoServe</li> </ul>	TechnoServe, a US non-profit-making company, provides information and capital, and strengthens markets for farmers for improved food productivity and distribution. Hence it is a source of information for drafting meaningful food and agriculture policies
<b>Farmers' organizations</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Swaziland National Agricultural Union (SNAU)</li> </ul>	SNAU brings together government, civil society organizations, and the private sector in agriculture to organize and facilitate policy dialogue
<b>Research and policy analysis institutions</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>University of Swaziland</li> </ul>	The university hosts a research centre that is key in carrying out research to collect and generate information, publish articles, and disseminate findings important for policy formulation. The institution is also rich in expertise important in guiding policy processes

Source: Authors.

### 2.1.2. The organization level

Researchers used a review of literature and a policy process mapping exercise to identify organizations to take part in the survey and to be interviewed to assess their capacity needs for accomplishing tasks related to the thematic issues. During the interviews, organizational representatives responded to a questionnaire developed to collect information on the characteristics of the organizations and their role in policy processes and the thematic areas identified earlier. As stipulated in the ToR, the questionnaire also collected data on how the organizations and their units are administered and coordinated; their processes for data organization, strategic analysis, M&E, and knowledge sharing; challenges and possible solutions; their capacity needs for improving these systems; and the constraints they face in their efforts to improve effective functioning.

### 2.1.3. The individual level

Researchers collected information on individual capacity within these organizations using a standardized questionnaire. Following procedures laid out in the ToR, the survey asked the heads of organizations identified through work at the policy process and organization levels for information on individuals in their organizations involved in the thematic areas, including data on their capabilities related to human, physical, and financial resources; research-policy linkages; the organization's contribution to policymaking; M&E issues; and constraints and proposed solutions. All these data helped us assess the capacity-strengthening requirements of the institutions.

## 2.2. Capacity-strengthening strategy

The methodology for the capacity-strengthening strategy in this study was aimed at generating information to identify gaps, constraints, and concerns at the three levels—policy, organizational, and individual. Researchers carried out a detailed analysis to appreciate the achievements, lessons learned and good practices, challenges and constraints, and gaps and issues, and suggested possible solutions at all levels under study. All the information so generated enabled researchers to formulate the vision, mission, objectives, and strategic interventions of the capacity-strengthening strategy. To ensure an enabling environment for effective implementation of the strategy, the research team also developed an implementation framework that includes policy, legal, institutional, and M&E frameworks.

## 3. CAPACITY NEEDS ASSESSMENT RESULTS

### 3.1. Policy process level

#### 3.1.1. Overview of overarching policy frameworks

In response to national demand, the government of Swaziland has introduced institutional and policy framework reform initiatives focusing on achieving sustainable human and socioeconomic development and alleviating poverty, among other things (Simelane 2010). The following instruments form the backbone of the policy environment.

The NDS, adopted in 1999, provided the overall framework for priority setting in Swaziland by formulating a vision and mission as well as relevant strategies to guide the socioeconomic development of the country for the next 25 years (Swaziland, MoEPD 1999). It was also expected to guide the formulation of development plans and facilitate the equitable allocation of resources, as well as strengthen the government's development planning and management capacities, anchoring them firmly to a national consensus as to the future direction.

The vision of the NDS for the agriculture sector is to develop and implement strategies that enhance food security, mitigate drought, alleviate poverty, and support sustainable utilisation of the country's natural resources (Swaziland MoEPD, 1999). Hence, the NDS is a road map describing the country's long-term socioeconomic development path, with the aim of ensuring food security in the country at household and national levels as well as commercialization of the agriculture sector, and efficient utilisation and management of water and land resources (Swaziland MoEPD, 1999).

In line with this vision and aim, the NDS (Swaziland, MoEPD 1999) emphasized improving water availability for both socioeconomic and economic productivity, as well as enhancing the production and diversification of crops and livestock for domestic and international markets by both small- and large-scale farmers; improving food management, processing, and storage techniques at the national and household levels; mapping food security risk and using drought early warning systems; and ensuring optimal distribution of food within households, communities, and regions. The document mapped out areas that would lead to the development of agriculture and eventually to poverty alleviation and improved quality of life. Two major policies came into being for these purposes:

- The PRSAP (Swaziland, PRTF 2005) is an overarching framework to address poverty and the challenges related to it. Its overall goal is to reduce poverty by more than 50 per cent by 2015 and ultimately eradicate it by 2022.
- The CASP (Swaziland, MoA 2005) set out to ensure that the agriculture sector contributes fully to the socioeconomic development of the country by
  - increasing agricultural output and productivity,
  - increasing the earnings of those engaged in farming and agriculture at large,
  - improving food security,
  - ensuring sustainable use and management of land and water resources, and
  - stabilizing agriculture markets.

### 3.1.2. Progress in implementing the CAADP agenda

Though it is one of the signatories to the 2003 Maputo Declaration, Swaziland was unable to fully initiate the CAADP process until March 2010, after endorsing the CAADP compact. Through endorsing the compact, Swaziland validated the CAADP programme's aims of stimulating and promoting agriculture-led development that would ultimately eliminate hunger and reduce poverty and food insecurity. Signing the compact committed the country to allocating at least 10 per cent of its national budget to agriculture, enabling the sector to achieve an estimated 6 per cent annual growth in AgGDP. After some inevitable delays, the government has managed to advance the CAADP agenda by collaborating with development partners and sector stakeholders to develop the SNAIP (Swaziland, MoA 2014). To a great extent, the SNAIP is expected to facilitate the formulation of new agriculture-sector policies in such areas as agricultural extension and research, water, and so on.

### 3.1.3. Gaps in the overarching policy frameworks

Prior to the National Agriculture Summit (NAS) in 2007, stakeholders' participation in policy processes was confined to a consultative role; the processes themselves were the exclusive responsibility of civil servants. When stakeholders were involved, they were called in only to validate and adopt the given policy, as was the case with the major policies cited above, the NDS (Swaziland, MoEPD 1999) and the CASP (Swaziland, MoA 2005). The PRSAP (Swaziland, PRTF 2005), however, was much more participative, with dialogues held countrywide. Still, stakeholders' participation in policy planning was limited, and even more so if the policy was strategic or involved investment planning.

According to a joint sector review by ReSAKSS–Southern Africa (ReSAKSS-SA 2015), post-NAS responsiveness and urgency to achieve the success of particular programmes has been modest, possibly due to weak coherence. The reviewers suggested that the implementation of programmes and processes has not been as successful as anticipated, due in part to the diverse nature of participants, each with a different agenda (ReSAKSS-SA 2015). Some stakeholders have gone so far as to confess apathy towards agriculture policy development and implementation, suggesting that their participation was not genuinely desired but rather a rubber-stamping effort by MoA.

Following the NAS (Swaziland, MoA 2008), the need to involve stakeholders was more appreciated in policy dialogues. For MoA, this move is crucial in the policymaking process, and for stakeholders, it is a critical opportunity to make policies more friendly and relevant. The NAS made key decisions that were to change the whole mode of policymaking, including decisions pertaining to land, chieftainship borders, water resources, and in response to demand from stakeholders, increasing responsiveness by MoA to farmers' needs and demands so as to improve their socioeconomic well-being. The summit resolved, among other things, to transform the agriculture sector through farmer empowerment by engaging all key stakeholders to adopt new approaches to sustainable development.

The 2015 annual conference of the Swaziland National Agricultural Union (SNAU) observed that although the policy environment was important to the successful implementation of agricultural development strategies, other agricultural policy issues also needed to be addressed. For example, policies already formulated lacked effective mechanisms for implementation and evaluation. According to the joint sector review report (ReSAKSS-SA 2015), certain formal reports on policy implementation are submitted at regular intervals, but this exercise remains characterized by a lack of inclusiveness and serious stakeholder engagement. Stakeholder apathy continues to be manifested. The need to improve the effectiveness of the implementation and evaluation of these policies is clear. The initiation of the joint sector review process of assessments will no doubt provide an effective route for effective and regular evaluations of policies and institutions, results and outcomes (ReSAKSS-SA 2015).

### 3.1.4. Recommendations to address overarching gaps in the policy framework

The proceedings of the 2007 NAS clearly revealed that agricultural dialogue was a precursor of many of the changes that have taken place in the policymaking domain countrywide, regardless of sector. The summit was a very productive and successful event that was also highly inclusive and participatory. It allowed all participants to freely air their views and to deliberate critical agriculture issues that affect their socioeconomic development. The ReSAKSS joint sector review identified some of the key decisions and commitments for action made at the NAS (ReSAKSS-SA 2015), reflecting what was supposed to have formed the agenda of action and follow-up stakeholder actions. Success, however, remains modest, and much more needs to be done not only to address these issues but to map out paths for future engagement. Remaining gaps in the policy and implementation process include the following:

1. Participants remain apprehensive about freely interacting with and participating in agricultural policy dialogues, suggesting that such forums have merely enabled MoA to use them for publicity. A major reason for this perception and the low participation is the lack of an institutional basis for stakeholders to participate in policy development processes (ReSAKSS-SA 2015). Without such a basis, civil servants are left to develop their own desired policy agendas, ignoring remaining policy gaps.
2. Some existing policies need to be reviewed because they were not appropriately grounded in stakeholder needs and demands, and thus fail to address endemic issues in the sector. The CASP (Swaziland, MoA 2004) is one such policy. It purportedly represents the national agricultural policy / strategic plan, yet it is, rather, an internal report developed by technocrats who, unfortunately, did not invoke the views of the major and perhaps most important stakeholder, the farmer. Moreover, it was largely a desk review, is more than 10 years old, and has been overtaken by events.
3. Between 2005 and 2015, the agriculture sector has gone through many challenges and constraints, and has even experienced some opportunities due to issues such as climate change, trade liberalization, and high input costs that frustrate farmers' efforts to increase productivity. The population has risen and with it the demand for land for production and settlements, leading to serious land degradation. Addressing these and many other issues can best be done through a new national agricultural policy and strategic plan that is participatory and recognizes the new environment in which agriculture has to perform.
4. The dominance of civil servants, especially at the top echelons, continues, subduing stakeholder participation. Increased and deliberate stakeholder participation would address this issue; at the same time, civil servants need to appreciate the importance of stakeholders, whatever the subsector, and not take them for granted. Arrangements for increased stakeholder participation would also address policy issues at the grass-roots level, thereby taking due account of real problems experienced by actual farmers, not civil servants.
5. Although MoA has a wide range of policies covering different subsectors—crops, livestock, forestry, fisheries—these are all disjointed guidelines with no overall guiding instrument under which they all pivot, and no implementation plans. The proposed new national agriculture-sector policy would address these inadequacies.
6. Finally, most policies in MoA are inadequately monitored and have insufficient implementation plans.

#### 3.1.4.1. Key issues

1. The many existing agriculture policies are not adequate to deal with the many problems, constraints, and challenges that the sector faces today, including low productivity, climate change and variability, globalization, loss of its US African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) eligibility, and so on. Worse still, the sector lacks an overarching agriculture-sector development policy and strategy that would coordinate and address needs and deliver improved productivity, exports, employment, and more. MoA should evolve a new national agriculture-sector policy to replace CASP.

2. Policies need to be revisited, and implementation plans as well as M&E mechanisms put in place.
3. Stakeholder participation needs to be promoted and appreciated, and issues warranting policies intensively debated until consensus is reached. An institutional stakeholder platform should be organized; SNAU could form the basis for such a platform.
4. The recent joint sector review (ReSAKSS-SA 2015) revealed that apathy among stakeholders is still rife. Stakeholders still shun meetings with the perception that their inputs are likely to be ignored anyway. Policy responsibility remains in the hands of the high-level government officials who keep the agenda and know what the meeting is expected to achieve. Civil servants therefore need to change their attitude towards farmers.

### **3.1.5. Agricultural policy formulation process**

#### **3.1.5.1. Policy formulation stage**

In MoA, issues to be addressed through policy measures originate from departments, and how they are handled depends on policies already in place and their relative importance in the hierarchy of policies. Food security, poverty alleviation, and diversification are some of the major policies with which any new policies must align. Newly identified issues may be purely administrative, may originate from the field or the public, or may originate from farming communities through the 17 MoA rural development area (RDA) centres. The NAS, for example, provided the most appropriate forum for discussing issues and identifying areas of concern to the ministry. Before the NAS, the government directed civil servants to address different issues largely through consultative processes whose membership was not as representative.

Policy formulation in Swaziland commonly follows the following format:

1. Situation analysis and problem identification
2. Formulation of policy objectives, vision, mission, and strategic objectives
3. Formulation of policy statement
4. Preparation of policy draft for onward processing on way to Cabinet
5. Formulation of implementation strategies, policy strategies, and M&E mechanisms and frameworks
6. For policies proceeding to Parliament, meeting of policy protagonists with Attorney General's Office to prepare the bill and regulations
7. Clearance of these two documents by the Cabinet before they are sent to Parliament

The relevant government departments usually conceptualize the policy areas to be addressed. According to the joint sector review (ReSAKSS-SA 2015), departments commonly acquire information about policy gaps from their interactions and engagement with stakeholders, for example at the RDA level, and thereafter initiate the policy development process and proceed to develop proposals for the principal secretary of MoA to seek the necessary resources such as funding and other logistics. The head of the department commonly forms a policy drafting team that oversees the policy development process; otherwise the department head remains the primary driver.

Stakeholders originate from a wide range of groups, including different but allied ministries such as the Ministry of Natural Resources and Economic Development. The private sector supplies its own stakeholders, and farming communities large and small also participate. Parastatal bodies and NGOs are nearly always represented. Participation may occur during the consultative stage, when the policy team holds discussions with key informant

individuals or organizations, most commonly for professional input. In addition, when the policy has reached draft form, it is presented to MoA stakeholders for input and clearance before it proceeds to a workshop-type consultative or validation stage.

Capacity at the institutional level—that is, in the departments—is limited. Policy development is an occasional event that is not provided for in the budget, and it is difficult for department heads to allocate funds across budget line items, let alone identify a full-time staff member to deal with policy development.

### ***3.1.5.2. Policy adoption stage***

During the policy development period, department representatives work with consultants to develop policy proposals. Once a proposal is advanced enough, it is presented to the heads of departments of the ministry for clearance, after which it may be presented for a consultative/validation workshop. Once the product has been amended and wholly accepted by stakeholders, it is deemed adopted by the stakeholders.

Following adoption by stakeholders, the head of the host department steers the proposed policy through the Principal Secretary's Office and on to the Cabinet for clearance. This stage of the process is handicapped by constraints similar to those stated elsewhere: lack of human capacity, funding, expertise, and physical capacity.

### ***3.1.5.3. Policy implementation stage***

Policy implementation refers to activities performed to ensure that policy decisions or recommendations are carried out following some approved implementation plan or path. The joint sector review (ReSAKSS-SA 2015) observed that MoA policies differ in several ways:

- Some policies have no implementation plans; they have no approval or blessings from the Cabinet and remain internal instruments (for example, CASP).
- Some policies have Cabinet approval but lack implementation plans; these, too, remain largely internal instruments.
- Other policies have Cabinet approval and have implementation plans or strategies as well as legal status.

Implementation processes thus differ according to the type of policy or instrument and, to a greater or lesser extent, according to the financial or resource requirements. Policies setting up parastatal bodies are normally effectively and efficiently implemented, regularly monitored, and frequently evaluated. Many policies within MoA requiring departmental implementation, however, may or may not experience rigorous implementation activities.

It should be observed that once particular policy proposals have been adopted and require approval from the Cabinet, ministry officials discuss them with the Policy and Programme Coordination Unit for clearance to proceed to the Cabinet for approval and adoption. After that, the policies are ready for implementation or else proceed to the legislative platform (ReSAKSS-SA 2015).

As suggested elsewhere, the capacity for policy development and management in Swaziland is practically non-existent. Resources will be required for policy implementation and management.

#### **3.1.5.4. Policy monitoring and evaluation**

M&E involves monitoring and checking the extent to which recommended policy implementation processes are proceeding and whether they are in line with stipulated schedules. Unfortunately, many of MoA's policies and strategies lack implementation plans, and hence the budget, to drive them, with the effect that M&E, though desirable, has rarely been institutionalized. Thus M&E is very weak and perhaps non-existent. The following are cited as exceptions:

1. The Department of Veterinary and Livestock Services (DVS) keeps records of livestock diseases, deaths, calves, and livestock movement from one part of Swaziland to another or from farmers to abattoirs. These activities are part of implementing the Livestock Identification Act, which requires branding and ear tagging of cattle and establishment of a computerized Swaziland Livestock Information and Traceability System (SLITS).
2. Departments submit reports to the ministry, the Cabinet, and the Parliament portfolio committee on agriculture, a partial requirement for the release of quarterly funds.
3. Current key players for M&E are the heads of departments in the ministry. At DVS, however, nearly all employees in the department are involved, from the dip tank attendant to the director.
4. M&E has limited funding, and MoA lacks the necessary resources to support a fully fledged M&E unit. Such a unit would require additional capacity in terms of human, physical, and financial resources.

#### **3.1.5.5. Key issues**

1. Policy development in MoA has improved; it has increasingly become more participatory than in the past. Participants, however, remain apathetic and do not believe in the sincerity of MoA.
2. M&E in the ministry is weak. Its presence and efficacy have experienced a constant decline since the 1990s. MEPD is responsible for M&E, but this function and the unit's responsibility for it have waned, primarily due to the lack of resources.
3. MoA regularly reports to the Cabinet and Parliament on progress being made on different projects.
4. The extent to which policies are monitored in the ministry remains modest.
5. DVS keeps records according to the requirements of the Livestock Identification Act, which requires branding and ear tagging of cattle and establishment of the computerized SLITS tracking system.

#### **3.1.6. Legislative processes**

Once a policy has been accepted by the Cabinet, the onus falls on MoA to advance the policy environment by either implementing the approved policy as is or advancing it to a legal instrument.

The process for policy legalization beyond Cabinet approval involves a relatively different route:

1. The approved policy returns to the host department, where amendments provided by the Cabinet are incorporated. The document is then passed by the principal secretary to the Attorney General's Chambers (AGC) for purposes of reviewing it and initiating the preparation of the bill and regulation.
2. This exercise often requires the assistance of an external consultant owing to the backlog of work in the AGC.

3. The consultant reviews all documents developed during the policy development process and approaches key informants for input. Once the bill and regulations have taken shape, they are first presented to the heads of departments and their professionals for review and input.
4. Following clearance from the AGC, the documents are presented to stakeholders for finalization and adoption.
5. The documents make another visit to the Cabinet offices for approval.
6. The bill and regulations are then presented to two agriculture Parliament portfolio committees by the minister of agriculture. Eventually the bill is debated in Parliament before being passed.
7. Once parliamentary approval has been obtained, it is presented to the king for assent.

The following are challenges the process has commonly experienced:

1. The AGC is nearly always busy with demands coming from all government institutions and parastatals. Getting a bill prepared takes a long time.
2. The requirement for stakeholder involvement faces challenges and problems; farmers fail to come for meetings for lack of time and money for transport. Those attending may not present farmers’ views.

**3.1.7. Inclusivity and stakeholder participation in the agricultural policy processes**

The government of Swaziland in general, and MoA in particular, have made considerable progress in involving as many stakeholders as possible in the policy development processes. This can be attributed to the recommendations from the 2007 NAS and subsequent efforts by different institutions to advance stakeholder engagement. These MoA attempts are exemplified by the ongoing policy development processes for (1) agricultural extension and (2) agricultural research. Unfortunately, stakeholder participation, especially for the smallholder farmers, is or may not be as regular as desirable, owing to finances and the timing of such meetings. Table 3.1 reflects some of the linkages in the policy formulation processes.

**TABLE 3.1: MAJOR STAKEHOLDERS IN POLICY DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES (ACTORS DIFFER BY SUBJECT MATTER AREA)**

Government/institution in the Ministry of Agriculture	Roles
Dept. of Veterinary & Livestock Services	Responsible for all agriculture-based policies, laws, and regulations
Dept. of Agriculture & Extension	
Dept. of Agricultural Research & Specialist Services	

Other government/institution	Role
Min. of Natural Resources	<p>Linking the agriculture sector to the economy</p> <p>Linkages include health, rural development, natural resource management, economic development, access to markets and finance, climate change, and so on</p> <p>Fiscal policy management</p> <p>Planning and policy management, monitoring, and evaluation</p>
Min. of Economic Planning & Development	
Min. of Finance	
National Meteorological Service	
Parastatal bodies	Role
National Maize Corporation	<p>Responsible for implementation, monitoring, and policing of specific agricultural policies, laws, regulations, and guidelines; facilitation and management of resources; and creation of enabling environments for stakeholders</p>
NAMBoard	
SWADE	
Swaziland Dairy Board	
Central Bank of Swaziland	
Swaziland Cotton Board	
Swaziland Environment Authority	
University of Swaziland Faculty of Agriculture	<p>Education, knowledge, and policy development, and providing evidence-based support during policy formulation and implementation</p>
Agricultural non-state actors	Role
TechnoServe	<p>NGOs and CBOs are commonly advisory networks that seek to advocate favourable enabling policy environments for farming communities.</p> <p>They promote dialogue and constructive engagement among stakeholders, discussing, for example, current and future policies, laws, and regulations. Hence, these are farmers' representatives in policymaking, implementation, and monitoring</p>
World Vision	
ACAT	
Smallholder farmers	
SNAU	
Private farmers	
Private sector	Role
Swazi-Trac	<p>Implementing agricultural policies including food and nutrition security policies, laws, regulations and guidelines.</p> <p>Since the National Agriculture Summit (2007), private-sector participation has been on the rise, as evidenced by the recently concluded policies on agricultural research and pesticides</p>
Vickery Seedlings	
Swaziland Sugar Assoc.	
FarmChem	
Swazican Fruit Canners	

Development partners	Roles
FAO	Provide technical, financial, and logistical support
IITA	Assist in addressing constraints and challenges
ARC	
EU	
IFAD	

Source: Authors.

Note: ACAT = Africa Cooperative Action Trust; ARC = Agricultural Research Corporation; CBO = community-based organization; EU = European Union; FAO = Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; IFAD = International Fund for Agricultural Development; IITA = International Institute of Tropical Agriculture; NAMBoard = National Agricultural Marketing Board; NGO = non-governmental organization; SNAU = Swaziland National Agricultural Union; SWADE = Swaziland Water and Agricultural Development Enterprise

### 3.1.8. Agricultural policy case studies

#### 3.1.8.1. *The national agricultural policy review process, case study 1: Swaziland National Agricultural Research Authority*

MoA regularly churns out policies covering different subsectors. Some of these policies are executive in nature, being propounded by the minister and the principal secretary. Some are ministerial policies requiring no formal procedures for implementation, such as CASP, formulated way back in 2005. Other policies are more elaborate, requiring approval by the Cabinet and Parliament. The case study presented here is the policy establishing the Swaziland National Agricultural Research Authority (SNARA) (Swaziland, MoA 2011a, 2011b, 2013).

The SNARA policy owes its beginnings to the National Agricultural Summit, held in 2007. At that summit, considerable debate took place on a wide range of issues that positively or negatively impinge on the sector. The following best captures the mood towards agricultural research at the event:

The research division is dilapidated, lacks policy direction and capacity. Farmers are unable to embrace the latest farming technologies because of lack of knowledge. Government should formulate a clear research policy and improve the infrastructure, for better service delivery. Research Division should engage competent personnel and expose them to advanced training (Swaziland, MoA 2007).

In 2010, MoA sought the necessary support to commence the policy formulation processes for agricultural extension and agricultural research. The processes were as follows:

#### *Preliminary arrangement*

MoA and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) established a three-member team of consultants to undertake the exercise. It proceeded as follows:

#### *Situational analysis*

The consultants started their assignment in April 2011. This assignment focused on improving the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability of the national agricultural research system (NARS) of Swaziland.

Data were collected through fieldwork undertaken during this stage of the assignment as well as a review of the available literature, as follows:

1. Primary data collection came from (1) agricultural research officers and managers, (2) agricultural extension service and subject-matter specialists, (3) key informant interviews with ultra
2. parastatal bodies (NMC; the Swaziland Dairy Board; the Swaziland Cotton Board; and the National Agricultural Marketing Board, or NAMBoard), and (4) focus group discussions with the University of Swaziland (UNISWA) Faculty of Agriculture.
3. As the drafting process advanced, stakeholder consultations were conducted: the draft proposal was presented to the department heads and professionals in MoA for review and debate.
4. Clearance by the ministry was followed by presentation to the stakeholder forum for debate, validation, and adoption.


### ***Road map***

Based on the situational analysis report adopted by stakeholders, a road map and strategy for developing a policy for a renewed national agricultural research system (NARS) was developed. The road map developed the findings further: it described the different ways that the renewed organization could look at and made proposals for three alternative policy objectives, letting the stakeholders select the one they preferred.

### ***SNARA policy formulation***

The development of the policy was the responsibility of the Department of Research and Specialist Services (DRSS). A consultant was hired to work with the department. Using the situational analysis and road map reports, the DRSS policy committee and the consultant proceeded to develop a policy document for discussion with stakeholders (Figure 3.1). The policy document was developed with the consensus of all DRSS researchers and managers. It was again submitted to the heads of MoA departments and thereafter presented to a stakeholder consultative workshop.

**FIGURE 3.1: SWAZILAND NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH AUTHORITY POLICY FORMULATION**



Source: Authors.

Note: CBO = community-based organizations; DRSS = Department of Research and Specialist Services; FAO = Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; M&E = monitoring and evaluation; NAMBoard = National Agricultural Marketing Board; NARS = national agricultural research system; NMC = National Maize Corporation; SADP = Swaziland Agricultural Development Project; SWADE = Swaziland Water and Agricultural Development Enterprise.

Intensive scrutiny by stakeholders plays a great role in improving the appeal of the policy. After demands from stakeholders are met, the policy document is submitted to the principal secretary.

The final Swaziland NARS policy was submitted to the Cabinet by the minister of agriculture in February 2013. It received assent two months later.

### *SNARA legislation processes*

To legalize the existence of SNARA, legislation was put in process. This involved the preparation of a bill and regulations. The two instruments were also validated by 66 members/stakeholders from government institutions as well as additional stakeholders in the agriculture sector and farmers. The bill and regulations have been submitted to the attorney general for review. The documents have been reviewed and returned to the ministry. They are back at the Cabinet before they can proceed to Parliament.

### *Implementation*

The implementation plan to operationalize SNARA has been presented to more than 100 stakeholders for scrutiny before adoption. The implementation plans are critical to the budgetary requirements of SNARA.

#### *3.1.8.2. Capacity gaps in the national policy case study*

1. In the exercise of developing the SNARA policy, the consultants worked closely with agricultural researchers, extension personnel, parastatal bodies, and the UNISWA Faculty of Agriculture. Unfortunately, farmers were not at all involved in the policy development process. They were invited to validate and adopt the policy.
2. The demand for an agricultural research policy transforming the NARS into policy was made at the NAS (2007). The proceedings of the summit informed the policymaking process.

#### *3.1.8.3. Policy-level capacity gaps*

1. The policy development processes have, since 2007, continued to be consultative; the level of stakeholder participation has also increased. Participation has continued to be at the later stages of policy development, just before the presentation for discussion, validation, and adoption. The major problem is the lack of logistics to identify and transport the farmers to and from the conference venue. Farmers may not be willing to attend if the meeting disrupts their farm operations.
2. According to the ReSAKSS-SA joint sector review (2015), a Policy and Programme Coordination Unit is based in the Cabinet Office. Its function is to provide technical support to government institutions and to ensure alignment to national priorities. Despite its presence and perceived functions, its presence in the policy development processes is largely amorphous, so that departments on their own will craft the policies for that body's review. This body needs to be more visible to government departments.
3. Although departments attempt to include participants from farming communities, they face a daunting task of identifying suitable participants to attend their meetings. The lack of an institutional base for stakeholders makes this difficult. Departments should take advantage of SNAU to identify participants for the policy development and implementation processes.
4. Resources including funding, tools and equipment, and human capacity present a major challenge to policy development.
5. Within MoA, there is no structure for coordinating policy formulation, management, and monitoring. Neither is there a body for identifying issues and challenges, and developing specific policy-, programme-, or even project-level policies. Departments manage their policies independent of others. The only time when department heads and professionals come to know and discuss new policies is when they meet to clear the policy for stakeholder discussion. There is no policy management secretariat.
6. Though MoA has many policies to implement, there are no mechanisms for monitoring the implementation processes. The exception is DVS.

#### **3.1.8.4. Strengthening policy formulation processes**

1. MoA needs to establish a policy unit, whose function would be to work with departments to identify policy gaps and work towards proposing policies that deal with the gaps. MoA should also attempt to establish a policy M&E role within this unit.
2. The establishment of the committee will enable MoA to provide an institutional base for purposes of establishing potential stakeholder participants who would be called upon to work on particular projects.
3. The establishment of such a unit will also facilitate networking and knowledge management for the benefit of all stakeholders. This will bring closer MoA agencies, NGOs, community-based organizations (CBOs), the private sector, development partners, and individual farmers.

#### **3.1.8.5. The national agricultural policy review process, case study 2: The national agricultural extension policy**

##### **Swaziland Agricultural Extension Service: Context**

The 1980s and 1990s experienced a Swaziland Agricultural Extension Service that was vibrant, effective, and relevant. It made significant contributions to the development of the agriculture sector. Unfortunately, performance declined; major challenges have taken place that have a direct impact on the extension system, including climate change, population increase, the HIV and AIDS pandemic, decline in the number of extension agents, international competition, the rise of NGOs, new information and communications technologies (ICT), and new trends in extension systems worldwide. To address the issue of poor performance of the extension service, a review by consultants was carried out. The objective was to assess the current national agricultural extension system, including MoA and non-state actors, and to outline a strategic framework for the renewal of the service and performance enhancement.

The reviews revealed the service was structured and patterned around the workings of government bureaucracy, with the trappings of extremely slow response or outright resistance to change. The service thus remained rigid and unchanged over the years and ceased to be innovative. There was also a lack of incentives for high levels of performance and sanctions for poor performance, implying that there was little room for striving for excellence and ample opportunity for only carrying out routine tasks. No unit within the extension system was responsible for M&E and knowledge management. ICT was in a rudimentary state, though improving.


The review also revealed that the service lacked an extension policy. This gap contributed to the limited coordination with agricultural research inside and outside the country and with the agricultural training system (UNISWA). The lack of an explicit extension policy statement also meant that the enabling environment for extension was not appropriately taken into account in the delivery of extension programmes.

The exercise was conducted according to participatory methodology; it was carried out in close collaboration with national, regional, and RDA-level personnel and structures within MoA, with non-state actors active in extension service provision, and with producers and their organizations included to ensure that the findings were based on first-hand insights and experiences from the ground. Based on these interactions, the needs for individual stakeholders were identified.

Following the different deliberations with stakeholders, the following vision for the Swaziland Agricultural Extension Service was adopted: an efficient, pluralistic, participatory, demand-led extension system where all farmers are able to demand and have access to high-quality extension services from those best able to deliver them. The pluralism in the delivery of extension services is built on the distinctive competence of the public sector, equipped with adequate competent staff, operational funds, and physical resources, and linked with value chain institutions, the private sector, research, academia, and farmer organizations, allowing for dynamic and evolving services offered at decentralized levels.

Figure 3.2 summarizes actions needed to enhance the Swazi national agricultural extension system. It shows the importance of organizing the demand, responding to demand, and supporting the response. It also indicates the critical role in this process of facilitation (training of facilitators), multi-stakeholder platforms for service delivery, and farmer organizational development. In spite of the recommendations of the consultants, actual policy formulation has yet to be finalized or agreed upon by the major subsectors, DVS and the Department of Agriculture and Extension (DAE).

**FIGURE 3.2: SERVICE DELIVERY FRAMEWORK AND STRATEGIES FOR OPERATIONALIZATION OF OPTIONS**



Hagmann, Connolly, Ficarelli, Ramaru 2002

Source: Hagmann et al. (2002), cited in Schorosch et al. (2011).

Note: OD = Organisational Development

### 3.2. Organization level

#### 3.2.1. Assessment of organization-level needs


This section of the report is based on the organization-level questionnaire, which consisted of 5 domains and 19 questions. These represented core capabilities of organizations and ranged from leadership to strategy coherence. The responses were given on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 representing a strong case position or strong agreement and 5 being an ineffective position or strong disagreement.

For purposes of interpretation, institutions were grouped as follows:

1. Government: MoA departments (DVS and DAE)
2. Parastatal bodies (NMC and Central Bank of Swaziland)
3. Private and NGO sectors (TechnoServe)
4. Farmers and farmers’ organizations (SNAU)
5. DRSS
6. Swaziland Economic Policy Analysis and Research Centre (SEPARC)

Figure 3.3 and Table 3.2 summarize the analysis.

**FIGURE 3.3: SUMMARY OF ORGANIZATIONAL SCORES ON DIFFERENT CORE CAPABILITIES**



Source: Authors.

Note: Core capabilities described in Table 3.2. DRSS = Department of Research and Specialist Services; GOS = government of Swaziland; NGO = non-governmental organization; SEP = Swaziland Economic Policy Analysis and Research Centre (SEPARC); SNAU = Swaziland National Agricultural Union; PARAST = parastatals

**TABLE 3.2: GROUP SCORES PER CORE-LEVEL SECTION AND STATEMENT**

Section/statement	Stakeholder organizations, by group <sup>a</sup>					
	Gov't	Parastatals	NGO	SNAU	SEPARC	Mean
<b>1. Capability to act and commit</b>	<b>2.8</b>	<b>2.9</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>3.2</b>	<b>3.3</b>	<b>2.9</b>
Leadership is responsive	2.0	2.5	3.0	3.0	1.0	2.3
Leaders of policy process organizations provide adequate guidance	2.0	2.5	3.0	2.0	2.0	2.3
Member/staff turnover relatively low	3.5	3.5	5.0	5.0	5.0	4.4
Member/staff of organization skilled to use evidence for strategic analysis	2.5	2.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	2.7
Appropriate incentives are in place	3.0	4.0	1.0	4.0	4.0	3.2
There is adequate funding from many sources	3.5	3.0	1.0	2.0	4.0	2.7
<b>2. Capability to adapt and learn (self-renewal, M&amp;E)</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>2.3</b>	<b>1.7</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>2.0</b>
Activities, outputs, outcomes, and performance markers effectively assessed	2.3	1.5	2.0	2.0	3.0	1.6
Sector reviews performed	2.7	2.5	2.0	2.0	3.0	2.4
Internal management and evaluation	3.0	3.0	2.0	2.0	3.0	2.6
Members/staff of organization feel free to propose new ideas	2.3	2.5	3.0	2.0	3.0	2.6
Your organization has an effective system to stay in touch	2.7	2.5	1.0	2.0	3.0	1.6
Your organization is effective in being open and responsive	2.0	1.5	1.0	2.0	3.0	1.1
<b>3. Capability to deliver on mandate and development objectives</b>	<b>2.4</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>2.1</b>
Your organization has a clear operational plan to carry out mandate	2.0	1.5	1.0	3.0	2.0	1.9
Your organization delivers its planned outputs in a timely manner	3.0	1.5	1.0	2.0	3.0	2.1
Your organization has mechanisms in place to verify that services meet demands	2.3	1.5	1.0	3.0	3.0	2.2
<b>4. Capability to coordinate and relate</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>1.9</b>
Your organization maintains effective coordination	2.5	1.0	1.0	3.0	—	1.5
Your organization effectively maintains relationships with networks	2.5	2.0	1.0	2.0	—	1.5
<b>5. Capability to achieve policy and strategy coherence</b>	<b>2.8</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>1.7</b>
Vision, mission, strategies regularly discussed	2.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	—	1.1
Operational guidelines to achieve policy and strategy coherence	3.0	2.0	2.0	1.0	—	1.6

Source: Authors.

Note: a Government = Departments of Research, Extension, and Veterinary and Livestock Services; Parastatals = National Maize Corporation and Central Bank of Swaziland; NGO (non-governmental organization) = TechnoServe; SNAU = Swaziland National Agricultural Union (participating as a community-based organization); SEPARC = Swaziland Economic Policy Analysis and Research Centre (a think tank). — = data not available; M&E = monitoring and evaluation

Overall responses on the different core capabilities (Figure 3.3) were as follows:

1. The analysis for the core capability to act and commit revealed that respondents were apprehensive about effective leadership in organizations (2.9); mean scores varied between 2.9 and 3.3, suggesting average to limited strategic abilities. The NGO and government institutions recorded overall effective and average scores on leadership (2.5 and 2.8, respectively); leadership in SNAU and SEPARC were clearly ineffective (both greater than 3.0). Variations in scores between institutions and across items were therefore recorded.
2. For the second core capability, relating to the level of effective M&E management, an overall response level of 2.0 was recorded, reflecting effective management. Government institutions averaged 2.5, reflecting an average level, whereas parastatal bodies, the NGO, and SNAU were perceived as strategic to highly strategic (2.3, 1.7, and 2.0, respectively). SEPARC M&E systems were average (Figure 3.3).
3. The analysis on the capability to deliver on mandates recorded an overall response of 2.1, suggesting effective or strategic levels. Government institutions' capability averaged 2.4, with parastatal bodies and the NGO being highly effective or strategic (1.0 and 1.5, respectively). For SNAU and SEPARC this was not the case, with their responses being classified as average. DRSS recorded a better response, of 2.3, or neutral status.
4. The overall responses on the fourth core capability, to coordinate and relate, averaged 1.9 for all institutions. Of these institutions, the best-appreciated capability was recorded in NGOs and parastatal bodies, which were both considered highly strategic (1.0 and 1.5, respectively); government and SNAU scores were average to effective.
5. Finally, for the fifth core capability, overall responses averaged 1.7 (strategic), suggesting a positive state of policy and strategic coherence. Government organizations were not judged to be as capable of achieving policy and strategic coherence for the food and agriculture sector, however, with a score of average to effective (2.8). The other organizations received responses characterizing them as highly strategic to strategic.

This section assesses responses based on the individual core capability items to identify sources of variation (Table 3.2). In this section's analysis, government organizations include DRSS.

### **1. Core capability to act:**

- For government departments, the averaged responses of 2.8 suggest average capabilities. Staff turnover (3.5), funding (3.5), and limited incentives (3.0) were major causes for the overall low rating.
- Parastatal organizations also recorded an average rating of 2.9; in this case, three major causes were identified: high staff turnover (3.5), lack of appropriate incentives (4.0), and inadequate funding (3.0). Inadequacy in incentives may be ascribed to Circular #4/2013 (Appendix 4). Otherwise, the parastatal bodies recorded scores of average to strategic.
- The NGO response was 2.5, suggesting average capability overall. This organization appears to be affected by high staff turnover (5.0), with scores on leadership in policy processes and leadership responsiveness being neutral
- SNAU's overall response was 3.2 (worse than average); the component responses show that SNAU's woes stem from high staff turnover and limited incentives.
- Finally, for SEPARC, the response of 3.3 (worse than average) stems from high staff turnover, lack of incentives, and limited funding.

## 2. Core capability to adapt and learn:

- For government organizations, an overall response of 2.5 was recorded. On the components, responses were critical of the performance of sector reviews, internal management and evaluation, and the effectiveness of M&E.
- Parastatal bodies posted an effective/adequate status of 2.3, with limited internal management and weak evaluation (3.0).
- Responses from the NGO for the six items together was strategic (1.7), with the lack of limited staff participation in discussion being a major handicap (3.0).
- SNAU's responses averaged a positive and strategic score (2.0), with all items recording the same level of response.
- Finally, SEPARC recorded an overall score of 3.0 for all component items, suggesting, on average, neutral responses.

The analysis for this core capability revealed an overall average score of 2.0. With the exception of SEPARC, respondents felt the organizations were handling M&E requirements for food security and agriculture programmes adequately. This is not surprising because government departments regularly have to submit certain reports to the Cabinet Office, and parastatal bodies and NGOs have to do the same to their supervising institutions, such as the Public Enterprise Unit.

## 3. Core capability to deliver on mandates and development objectives:

- Average responses for government departments (2.5), 2.3 for parastatal bodies, and 1.7 for NGOs.
- For government institutions, the overall determining factor was apprehensiveness about the departments' delivery of planned outputs on time (3.0). For SNAU, this response was attributed to limited agreement on the item—the organization had clear capacity to carry out its mandate.

4–5. Responses on the remaining core capabilities were largely highly strategic to strategic. Government institutions, however, recorded a weak response on the fourth capability, policy and strategy coherence (2.8), and this was attributed to the lack of operational plans to achieve policy and strategy coherence. This is not surprising because many MoA policies do not have implementation plans and budgets.

### 3.2.2. Organization-level needs based on strengths and weaknesses

This section of the report reflects on the findings on the strengths and weaknesses endemic in the different organizations. The findings are presented by organization.

#### 3.2.2.1. Government organizations

The organizations considered in this section include DVS, DAE, and DRSS. Government departments have specific missions and mandates. Overall, however, they are all collectively responsible for national and MoA agricultural policies for food and nutrition security and for increasing and sustaining agricultural productivity through diversification and enhancement of commercial agricultural activities and other planned developments (Swaziland, MoA 2014). For these institutions to achieve their mandates, there must be resources to facilitate implementation. The following reflects the strengths and weaknesses within the organization according to the core capabilities.

Overall, the responses reflected that respondents were satisfied, with leadership described as competent, forward-looking, and proactive. Staff job satisfaction and general competence were evident, and funding was reported to be stable and assured.

There are enabling policies for each department; leadership encouraged departments to bring to the fore issues that require attention. Recent examples that may be cited are the creation of SNAU as well as the fisheries, agricultural extension, and agricultural research policies that have received Cabinet assent.

Government departments receive their budget allocations from the central government; the finances so allocated are already itemized and earmarked for specific activities. A major weakness cited by the respondents is funding shortfalls that make it difficult to address items not in the budget, even those involving policy implementation. Departments do not have strategies to mobilize resources, and in any case, financial regulations do not permit the practice unless cleared by MEPD. Second, organizations lack tools and equipment (such as computer software and hardware) to implement policies and strategies; this is worsened by the limited capabilities among staff, and their low numbers as well, in those organizations. Remuneration remains unattractive, resulting in attrition among professionals and lack of interest in undertaking extra responsibilities. Hence, the needs in government agricultural agencies include acquisition of software and hardware, tools, and equipment, as well as training in policy development and strategic planning, and in implementing effective M&E programmes.

### **3.2.2.2. Parastatal bodies**

The government has several parastatal bodies responsible for implementing commodity-specific policies; these include maize (NMC); horticultural products (NAMBoard); cotton (the Cotton Board); the dairy industry (the Dairy Board); and water resource management (SWADE). The operations of these bodies are monitored and evaluated by a cabinet-level agency, the Public Enterprise Unit. This study obtained limited data from the Central Bank of Swaziland, the Swaziland Cotton Board, NMC, and SEPARC. Other parastatal bodies were too busy to attend to the survey despite the pleas made by researchers. Analysis revealed the following.

Parastatal bodies reported satisfaction with leadership as being responsive and supportive. Their staffing levels are adequate and well versed in organization mandates; the staff is mostly young and has adequate analytical levels and skills for dealing with economic development and policy analyses. The organizations routinely undertake strategic planning. M&E is routine and required by the Public Enterprise Unit for compliance. Many parastatal bodies are self-financing, technically sound, and knowledgeable. They have the capacity to engage in networks, alliances, and other collaborative bodies because these are instrumental for their own existence.

Operations in parastatal bodies are frustrated by several weaknesses. One of the most important relates to those instances where the leadership in policy development and strategic planning is not selected on the basis of education and experience but on some political criterion; such leadership lacks capacity to lead policy processes and is often not goal driven, leading to inertia. In addition, not all decision makers are well versed in policy issues in the different parastatal bodies, yet they have to lead the processes. The situation is made worse by lack of engagement and regular dialogues and debates on thorny issues in the sector or industry. This strangles policy development and strategic planning in organizations, leading to their decay.

M&E is conducted, but its weakness is that it does not feed into strategic plans. Business processes are not properly documented and are often jumbled up, making it difficult to track operations. The lack of appropriate tools and equipment, including reliable Internet services, adds to the shortcomings within these departments.

Remuneration is often not attractive, and being limited by the government Circular #4/2013 (Appendix 4) and limited incentives. This is having negative effects on morale and to some extent contributes to professional staff attrition. Policies or policy amendments have been imposed, to the detriment of organizational performance, especially if these are not discussed with stakeholders. Finally, in these organizations, plans do not cascade to staff levels lower than management.

### **3.2.2.3. Non-governmental organizations**

Data were obtained from only one NGO, TechnoServe. The other NGOs failed to respond despite the many promises made and meetings held. This makes it difficult to generalize the responses.

The major strengths in this group are that leadership is passionate, responsive, and dedicated. Leadership and staff members attend periodic training in policy advocacy, lobbying, and negotiation. TechnoServe recognizes MoA's extensive mandate and is committed to achieving it. Employees grow professionally, acquiring analytical skills in different aspects of TechnoServe's operations. There is a strong in-house training programme to which the many agricultural university graduates are exposed. Though conditions of employment appear attractive, tenure of employment is short, owing to the cyclic nature of NGO funding, and this results in regular staff attrition.

Because TechnoServe is a donor-funded NGO, its M&E system is well developed—the M&E tools, surveys, logical frameworks, and programme evaluations are all in place. It has also a digital system for different functions as well as different Internet service providers. Information is disseminated regularly to clientele within and outside Swaziland. As an international NGO, it participates in local, regional, and international networks.

Funding is limited and tied to projects. The organization lacks dedicated M&E staff. It cannot readily access national data and observes that it is difficult to have dialogues with public servants.

### **3.2.2.4. Swaziland National Agricultural Union**

SNAU is a farmers' organization. It is an apex body for all farmer organizations in the kingdom and was established with the full blessing of MoA and the Southern African Confederation of Agricultural Unions (SACAU) in 2007. It aims at promoting and safeguarding the interests of farmers by linking them with stakeholders and stakeholder organizations and facilitating the required enabling environment for production as well as access to markets, research, and improved technology. SNAU's focal strategic objectives are policy education and advocacy, institutional capacity building, and partnership development. SNAU has, since its existence, organized and participated in many policymaking or development activities, among which may be cited the recently concluded annual conference (SNAU 2015).

SNAU is a major ally in the establishment of participatory policymaking. Its major weaknesses are inadequate budget and limited institutional capacity to drive its agenda. In addition, SNAU is concerned about its membership's limited participation in policy initiatives, let alone receiving feedback; farmers' views at the community level are thus not collected, let alone embraced, with advocacy meetings being largely in abeyance. The lack of adequate financial support and staff capacity limit the scope of its operations.

SNAU's formation stemmed from a resolution made at the NAS. It is therefore not surprising that the organization is seriously accepted by the leadership at the government and ministry levels. Leadership attends policy dialogues, meetings, and training. It produces regular monthly, semi-annual, and annual reports that are circulated, and many of its activities follow donor-specific M&E formats. The strategic framework of the organization is informed by membership every four years. Finally, SNAU conducts policy consultations and conferences with membership and stakeholders, and actively participates in network meetings locally and regionally.

### **3.2.2.5. SEPARC**

Some of SEPARC's institutional staff were recruited from government; the effect has policy implications. The organization, however, suffers from resource limitations, and hence not all decisions are appropriately informed. Second, M&E processes do not directly feed into strategic planning. Staff numbers tend to be low and the rate of turnover high.

### 3.2.3. Key issues from organization-level assessments

Based on benchmark scores (Table 3.2), the following are identified as major issues:

1. The responses about the different core capabilities revealed that for all the organizations, capability to act and commit were neutral (2.0), but scores were much higher on the rest of the core capabilities (1.5–2.0). A major feature is that coordination capacities were wanting in the different organizations involved in policy dialogues.
2. In all organizations, staff satisfaction appeared to be low owing to different government regulations, for example, Circular #4/2013; staff turnover is rather high owing to limited incentives and the lack of permanence of positions (tenure is based on project funding). This constrains capacity and institutional memory.
3. For implementation policy and strategic plans, funding appears to be the major bottleneck to funding staff, operations, and the necessary tools and equipment—computer hardware and software. This is exacerbated by the lack of systems for data collection, analysis, interpretation, and reporting.
4. Although in many organizations statistical reports and other performance reports are compiled in accordance with regulations, these reports are not open to the public for information or scrutiny. Public-private dialogue is limited and in some cases, information, communication, and knowledge management are non-existent. The infrastructure to facilitate information exchange in MoA is too old to achieve the purpose.
5. SNAU promotes policy consultations with members in an attempt to set up a platform for members to discuss pertinent policy issues; lack of funding frustrates these attempts.
6. In several organizations, operational plans are in place; implementation continues to be frustrated by funding shortfalls.
7. Although the M&E system in the DVS of MoA is functional, the rest of the MoA departments lack this feature. This is made worse by inactivity in the Central Statistical Office, where agriculture data are collected and passed on for use. Strategic planning, nevertheless, is hardly influenced by the M&E database, nor is policy development informed by such data. DVS has a wealth of data on livestock, but the extent to which these data are being used to influence policy in livestock is not apparent.

## 3.3. Individual level

A questionnaire was used to generate information regarding individual needs of the institutions studied. Information including human resources, financial resources, physical resources, research-policy linkages, evidence-based policymaking, statistics and M&E, constraints, solutions, and policymaking capacity was collected using the questionnaire. Responses from the interviews were recorded and are reported for each individual organization for which data were available. Information on ICT in MoA was aggregated for three departments: DRSS, DVS, and DAE. More detailed information related to the individual-level needs assessments from institutions that participated in this survey are presented.

### 3.3.1. Government institutions

#### 3.3.1.1. Ministry of Agriculture departments

MoA hosts a number of departments, three of which participated in this survey. Participating departments were DRSS, DAE, and DVS. The MoA Economic Planning and Analysis Section politely failed to participate despite its critical role in MoA.

There were not many observable differences in the following: policy capacity needs, level of skills needed, challenges and constraints, and gaps and emerging issues. Differences were observed in human, physical, and financial resource levels, which differed from one department to the next. The more detailed findings relating to human resources, financial resources, physical resources, and several others are presented.

### *Human resources*

The number of employed professionals in the three MoA departments was estimated at about 136 (85 males and 51 females), of whom 48 staff members hold master's degrees and the rest (88) are bachelor's degree holders. There is effective utilization of human capital at the ministry; the human resource department is, however, constrained by low quality, wanting human resource management, and low retention of human capital (relatively high attrition). These professionals are spread across the three departments. MoA devotes most of its time to the provision of extension services.

### *Financial resources*

Financial resources of the ministry match the government budget, which runs from April to March every year. Information provided for total budgets was mainly based on the recurrent budget rather than capital budgets. The ministry's total annual budget in 2013/2014 was E207,918,287, whereas the total annual expenditures for the same year were estimated at E271,300,065. The ministry departments agreed that financial resources were stable.

### *Physical resources*

1. During the time of interview, the ICT section reported that the ministry has at least 150 computers countrywide. All the 150 computers had word processing software; at least 5 computers had a geographic information system (GIS), and 6 had SPSS Statistics analytical software.
2. About 500 vehicles were available for use by staff for different purposes as directed.
3. The ministry had about 100 connected telephone landlines.
4. The respondents indicated that they lacked ICT equipment and facilities for the smooth functioning of the ministry.
5. Other constraints described included difficulties in acquiring software and lack of capacity to effectively use the hardware. For example, only 4 researchers could use SPSS, 5 could use Excel, and 10 could use ArcView GIS.
6. The Internet connection at all the ministry's departments is rated as very slow, and on average takes more than two minutes to load and one to two minutes to download a 1 MB data document.

### *Research-policy linkage*

MoA is reported to have developed at least six food security and agriculture policy projects in the last two years; some of these were accompanied by communication strategies. These projects related to agricultural extension, agricultural research, irrigation, livestock, fisheries, and so on. The most important stakeholders the ministry deals with, in order of rank, include farmers, donors, NGOs and CBOs, the National Planning Commission, public organizations, the private sector, and parliamentary groups. The ministry participates in public policy dialogues and multi-stakeholder consultations through one-day and three-day workshops, seminars, and meetings.

Means and tools used by MoA in the past two years to disseminate and communicate research findings have included personal contacts with officials, small round-table discussions with key stakeholders, policy briefs, and presentations. Policy reports, workshops or conferences, and policy briefs to ministries were ranked high as institutional influences on the policy process. The findings of this study indicate that the ministry is a valuable source

of research findings, data, and statistics. It was reported that MoA has some influence on the budget-making processes (in terms of openness, quality, and equity) in the agriculture sector. Furthermore, the ministry, to a limited extent, holds the government accountable for implementing food and agriculture policies. The institution's policy research is communicated effectively for use in policymaking. Policy reports, workshops or conferences, and policy briefings to ministries or government-based task forces are seen as the most effective communication channels of policy results to the relevant stakeholders.

### *Evidence-based policymaking*

MoA plays a specific role as a policy adviser in the food and agriculture sector for the government, and most of its senior staff are involved in this process. Its mission, after all, is to ensure food security, among other things. Hence, attending to and providing advice on food and agriculture policy is part of the ministry's role.

At least once a week, the personnel in MoA are called to different meetings to give advice on food and agriculture policies that are being developed or need to be developed in Swaziland. It is not surprising that the level of use of the policy advice from the ministry to policymakers was rated as high (4, with 5 referring to complete use). Reports are written by the ministry as evidence of its participation at all levels, such as providing advice to drafters of the policy document during meetings and consultations, making written comments, or reviewing drafts. Monthly, quarterly, and annual performance reviews are also produced for the Cabinet.

### *Statistics, monitoring, and evaluation*

The M&E system at the ministry is not fully functioning, and there was less reporting presented on M&E at the organization than on other factors. Survey and data collection activities implemented by the ministry in the last five years were related to production levels of different agricultural subsectors affected by the drought. The ministry's capacity for data collection, data processing, data analysis, and data reporting and sharing, judged as adequate, was relatively low. The three primary clients for the ministry's data include farmers, NGOs, and the private sector. The organization lacks analytical tools and its analysis is mainly carried out using Excel spreadsheet software. The collected data are used in writing annual reports and documents to influence policymaking. Challenges related to the statistics and M&E systems of the ministry include low quality of human capacity; lack of adequate funding for regular data collection; and problems of data collection, management, and distribution.

### *Policymaking capacity*

The major committees and task forces for food and agriculture policymaking in Swaziland include the ministerial committee and parliamentary subcommittees. MoA has been involved in these committees for the last five years, and its contribution is imparted through verbal advice in policy development during meetings or presentations, provision of written comments or reviews of drafts, contributions of drafts to specific sections of the policy document, or leadership in the drafting of the policy itself. More than 10 publications and reports from the ministry have been used in policy or strategy development. The ministry also participates in food security-related local and regional networks and associations, including SNAU, the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT), the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA), the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-arid Tropics (ICRISAT), the Agricultural Research Corporation (ARC), and UNISWA. The strategy/policy documents approved by the government in the last five years in which the ministry has played a role are many and include the SNAIP; policies on smallholder markets and agricultural production, pesticide management, irrigation, extension, and agricultural research; NAS; and the SLITS tracking system.

### *Constraints and solutions*

The human resource constraints faced by MoA include the following:

- Human capacity is of low quality and there is high turnover; a suggested solution is increased short-and long-term training, which in turn may increase job satisfaction.

- Funding sources are inadequate and unavailable to support items not in the budget.
- ICT facilities—hardware and software—are limited; tools and equipment present are obsolete and out of date.
- Departments indicated understaffing and a lack of specialists in subject matter areas such as M&E, knowledge management skills, management, and organization. Suggestions to address the human resource quality and quantity constraints and to deal with the gaps included an increased number of staff, recruitment of multi-skilled staff, and skilled assistance with human resource and financial management.
- Respondents further indicated that there is a need to engage professionals, such as a financial controller, in the ministry’s system. To solve the financial challenges, the respondents suggested that the government expand its financial base and allow the departments to source funds independently.
- Finally, some structures housing MoA operations are dilapidated, old, and in poor condition, with outdated laboratories. Rehabilitation of offices is required.

### **3.3.1.2. Government parastatal bodies**

#### **3.3.1.2.1. Central Bank of Swaziland**

##### **Human resources**

The Central Bank of Swaziland plays an important role, especially during financial decision-making processes at the pre-implementation and implementation stages of food and agriculture policies in the country. The bank is endowed with 20 professionals (12 males and 8 females), who are involved in policy-related issues; they include 1 PhD holder, 9 master’s degree holders, and 10 BSc holders. The Central Bank of Swaziland is constrained by limited opportunities for training, resulting in low-quality human capacity; low staffing levels due to budget issues; low wages, which affect retention of human capital; and high variations in job descriptions, which affects performance.

##### **Financial resources**

Activities of the Central Bank of Swaziland are mainly financed by the government. The information on finance discussed below relates to the recurrent budget.

##### **Physical resources**

During the survey, the respondents reported that the bank possessed 20 computers; all the computers operated word processing software and analytical software. The optimal or intended number of computers was 26.

- Currently, analytical software has been installed on all 20 computers.
- The respondents, however, lacked knowledge on bibliography management software.
- Bank staff members had access to 10 organizational vehicles.
- Offices were connected to at least 12 landlines and 1 mobile phone.
- The respondent observed that office space was limited.
- Personnel lack knowledge and skills in the use of the following software: analytical software including EViews and Excel, with Excel being used daily whereas EViews is used two to three times a week.
- The bank’s Internet connection was ranked as moderate, with the average time taken to load being 14–29 seconds and the average time to download a 1 MB data document estimated at between 1 and 2 minutes.

### *Research-policy linkage*

There was no food and agriculture policy research or analysis project undertaken by the Central Bank within the last two years. In order of ranking, MoA, the private sector, donors, the National Planning Commission and parastatal bodies, NGOs, parliamentary groups, and the community are the most important stakeholders of the Central Bank. The Central Bank uses personal contacts with officials, small round-table discussions with key stakeholders, policy briefs, and presentations as means and tools to disseminate and communicate research information. The bank claimed to be a valuable source of research data and statistics. To some degree, the Central Bank influences the budget-making process (in terms of openness, quality, and equity) in the food and agriculture sector, although it does not hold the government accountable for implementing food and agriculture policies. Research-generated data from the bank were communicated effectively for use in policymaking. Policy reports, policy briefs, appearances on radio and TV, workshops or conferences, and policy briefings to ministries or government bodies were regarded as important as channels of communication.

### *Evidence-based policymaking*

The Central Bank has played a specific role as a policy adviser on food and agriculture issues for the government, and at least two of its researchers act as policy advisers. The Central Bank publishes reports and statistical bulletins annually; these inform stakeholders on different issues and statistics regarding public expenditures on food and agriculture projects in the country.

### *Statistics, monitoring, and evaluation*

The bank has a fully functioning M&E system; it also periodically produces M&E reports for the purposes of learning and redefining programmes. The Central Bank generates data annually through company surveys and balance-of-payments information. The data originate from agricultural companies and aggregated national agricultural production data; data gathering is carried out countrywide.

This institution is constrained by inadequate human capacity for data collection, processing, and analysis. The three primary users of data generated by the bank include the government, private banks, and researchers from universities. The analytical software used in data processing includes Excel and EViews. In addition to surveys, the bank uses quarterly reports from other sectors within the government.

The statistics and M&E system is constrained by low-quality human capacity; high human capital turnover; inadequate funding; and problems related to data collection, management, and distribution.

### *Policymaking capacity*

The agricultural portfolio committee was identified as the major parliamentary committee for food and agriculture policymaking in Swaziland. Although the bank has not participated directly in the agricultural portfolio committee, its research and analytical products have been used in policy/strategy documents. The data are presented in the form of annual and quarterly reports. The organization does not directly participate in food security-related networks and associations.

### *Constraints and solutions*

The bank is faced with challenges of relatively incompetent human resource in terms of policy-related issues. Solutions to solve these human resource challenges at the bank include an increased staff training budget and increased remuneration. The budget allocated to research was reported to be insufficient; there is a need to increase the budget for the research department of the bank. Limited office space is also a physical resource challenge that the bank faces; new buildings to provide the required space are advocated.

### ***3.3.1.2.2. National Maize Corporation of Swaziland***

NMC was established in 1985 with aims of guaranteeing a market to local maize producers at competitive prices and providing good-quality maize at competitive prices to the Swazi nation. It focuses on local purchase, storage, and release of maize. It is thus directly involved in food security issues. The following provides a description of its capacity.

#### ***Human resources***

The chief executive officer of NMC reported that the organization was employing 6 male staff and 8 female staff; of these, 3 held master's degrees and 11 had bachelor's degrees. NMC is constrained by inadequate quality of human capacity, inadequate quantity of human capital, and low retention of human capital.

#### ***Financial resources***

The NMC financial year begins on 1 April and ends on 31 March of the following year. The total annual budget of the organization for the financial year 2012 was E20 million, and total annual expenditures were estimated at about E11 million. In 2013, NMC's estimated total annual budget increased to E23 million and total annual expenditures were estimated at E12 million. There was an observable decline in the organization's total annual budget in 2014 compared with those of previous years (2013 and 2012).

#### ***Research-policy linkage***

NMC undertook at least five food and agriculture policy research or analysis projects in the last two years. The main stakeholders, ranked in order of importance, were the farmer, government ministries, parliamentary groups, donors, the private sector, NGOs/CBOs, and the National Planning Commission and different parastatal organizations. NMC managed to conduct at least six public consultations on food and agriculture policy issues in the last two years; it also conducted policy dialogues within the same period of time. Public consultations included feasibility studies for the Lower Usuthu Smallholder Irrigation Project; storage improvement of maize in rural areas; supplementation of farmer inputs; a maize pricing model; and contract farming for increased production of maize. The organization conducted two-hour seminars, half-day policy dialogues/meetings, and one-day workshops/conferences.

Communication tools used by NMC include presentations to officials; small round-table discussions with officials and key stakeholders; public round-table discussions with officials and the press; newsletters, policy briefs, and presentations to officials; and press conferences, panel discussions, and other work with media to influence government.

Quarterly reports are requested by government policymakers to provide specific information on food and agriculture issues. Research, data, and statistics generated by NMC are viewed as very valuable. The organization has some influence on the budget processes in food and agriculture, and somewhat has an impact on holding the government accountable for implementing food and agriculture policies.

NMC's research policy is communicated effectively for use in policymaking, and policy reports, media briefs, appearances on radio and TV, and workshops/conferences are regarded as the most important channels of communication in terms of communicating policy results to the relevant stakeholders.

#### ***Evidence-based policymaking***

NMC plays a specific role as a policy adviser in the food and agriculture sector for the government, with three staff members regularly taking part in the advisory role. The organization receives requests related to food and agriculture policy issues on a quarterly basis. NMC has been involved in the development of food and agriculture policy/strategy documents in the last five years. These documents include annual reports, human resource review policies, risk management policies, and NMC procurement policies. At least seven NMC publications and report documents have been used in government policy/strategy documents.

### *Statistics, monitoring, and evaluation*

The organization has a fully functioning M&E system, and M&E documents are produced periodically for purposes of learning and redefining programmes. Furthermore, M&E reports are functional for learning purposes. Survey data collection activities by NMC implemented in the last five years include a maize production survey in 2014. The three primary clients who use NMC data are MoA, the private sector, and farmers. The organization is constrained by inadequate quality and quantity of human capacity to handle M&E-related issues.

### *Constraints and solutions*

The major constraints faced by NMC in regard to research, strategic policy analysis, and investment planning include hardships in attracting and retaining the right skills due to unattractive salary packages; the suggested solution is to revise Circular #4/2013 (Appendix 4).

The constraints facing programme management and M&E include lack of exposure to risk management, which can best be solved by providing training at all levels of management on internal controls, process management, and risk management. The constraints faced by the organization in line with knowledge management, data system development, and information sharing are developing and managing business processes, and lack of implementation and proper control of business processes; these can be solved through employee training and constant supervision.

### *3.3.1.2.3. The Swaziland Economic Policy Analysis and Research Centre*

#### *Human resources*

SEPARC employs one technical person to take responsibility for policy-related issues. The incumbent is a male and holder of a master's degree. The respondent agreed that the quality of human capacity is a constraint and added that economic policy research needs a technical person with higher degree qualifications, such as a PhD qualification. The organization, the respondent said, was understaffed in relation to its broad mandate. This affects specialization because professionals have to be versatile as opposed to working in their own areas of specialization. Management of human capital was also reported to be a constraint in the organization because, with researchers not working in their own areas, it lacks specific focal areas. This makes management of human capital tricky and difficult. Retention of human capital is also a constraint in the organization due to low remuneration. It was reported that that low salaries paid by the organization made it impossible for the organization to employ sufficiently qualified staff; it is expected that this may be addressed by the ongoing review of the organization.

#### *Financial resources*

The financial year of the organization runs from 1 April of the current year to 31 March of the following year. This matches the national budget's financial year. There is an observable increment in the budget: the 2012 total annual budget was estimated at E7, 832,164; this has since declined, but the organization reported itself to be financially insecure.

#### *Physical resources*

The organization has only one computer with installed word processing software, bibliographic management software, and analytical software. There are two vehicles and one phone owned by the organization. The analytical software in use in the organization includes Stata, SPSS Statistics, EViews, and Excel. The speed of the Internet connection was reported to be slow, taking about 14–29 minutes to load information and 1–2 minutes to download a 1 MB data document.

### *Research-policy linkage*

At least two food and agriculture policy research projects were undertaken by SEPARC in the last two years (2013 and 2014). In order of importance, SEPARC's stakeholders for its products include government ministries; parastatal bodies; the private sector; NGOs/CBOs; and the National Planning Commission, development partners, and Parliament. The organization participated in policy dialogues, public consultations, and policy development in food and agriculture policy issues in the last four years (2010–2014). There have also been four half-day policy dialogues/meetings organized by SEPARC. The mostly commonly used communication channels by the organization are personal contact and work with media to influence government (used four and three times, respectively, during the four-year period). Other communication channels used were presentations, policy briefs, public round tables, press conferences, and small round-table discussions with officials and key stakeholders. The organization, though new, is regarded as a valuable source of research, data, and statistics, and the organization's policy research is communicated effectively for use in policymaking.

### *Evidence-based policymaking*

Although the organization has not done much in terms of providing policy advice related to food and agriculture, it has received requests to provide policy advice on food and agriculture–related issues, and such requests are received annually.

### *Statistics, monitoring, and evaluation*

SEPARC agreed that the organization had a fully functioning M&E system. Periodically the organization produces M&E reports for the purposes of learning and redefining programmes, and the M&E reports are functional for learning purposes. The respondent indicated that the organization collected specific data for its research and consultancy purposes, so that no data are available to the public. The analytical tools/methods used for data analysis/processing are EViews, Excel, SPSS Statistics, and Stata. Inadequacies in human capacity, numbers, funding routine, regular data collection, and leadership were regarded as major constraints for the efficiency and effectiveness of the M&E system.

### *Constraints and solutions*

The organization was constrained by the lack of M&E and information technology specialists; capacity gaps were observed. Some of the suggested solutions include increasing remuneration to attract PhD holders, capacitating current staff, and increasing SEPARC's staff complement.

## **3.3.2. Civil society organizations**

### **3.3.2.1. Swaziland National Agricultural Union**

#### *Human resources*

SNAU employs one technical person to run the day-to-day business of the farmers' union; more technical personnel would improve the fortunes of the organization. The person currently employed by the union as manager is a male who holds a bachelor's degree in agricultural economics. The manager works with other personnel in the different departments, including finance, transport, and human resources. The organization is mainly dominated by males, with only one female. The quality and quantity of human capital are the major constraints faced by the organization.

### *Financial resources*

SNAU operated on an estimated annual budget of E683,500 in the 2011/2012 financial year, which covers both the recurrent and the capital budget. The total annual budgets of the organization for financial 2012/2013 and 2013/2014 were estimated at E627,881 and E627,157, respectively. The total annual expenditures for those financial years (2012/2013 and 2013/2014) were estimated at E630,030 and E729,049, respectively. The organization received additional financial support worth E105,030 through bilateral and multilateral donors.

### *Physical resources*

Although SNAU intended to own six computers, it has only two computers with word processing software installed. None of the computers has bibliographic software, though SPSS Statistics has been installed. The organization has one vehicle but intends to have at least four. There is only one telephone landline connected and one official mobile phone, compared with the intent to have six of each. SNAU has inadequate office space. The Internet connection was reported to be fast, taking 5–14 seconds to load and 30–59 seconds to download a 1 MB data document.

### *Research-policy linkage*

At least two food and agriculture policy projects were undertaken by the organization; one of these projects was developed with a communication strategy. In order of importance, farmers, MoA, parastatal bodies, the private sector, and NGOs/CBOs are SNAU's major stakeholders. SNAU has conducted public consultations on food and agriculture policy issues in the last two years, and these include an annual conference on agribusiness development and collective action, a tractor pool hire and service consultation, and a consultation on youth participation in agriculture. The organization has also conducted policy dialogues and public consultations in the last four years. The organization has participated in several events including two seminars, half-day policy dialogue/meetings, one-day workshops/conferences, two-day workshops/conferences, and three-day workshops/conferences. Global events attended include the Platform of African Farmers' Organizations network; the continental briefing by the Southern African Development Community (SADC); and regional CAADP, Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa, SADC, and SACAU meetings. The major communication tools used by the organization include personal contacts, small round-table discussions, policy briefs, and presentations to officials to influence government decisions. SNAU provides advice to government on issues related to food and agriculture policies, and staff members participate in these activities. On a quarterly basis, the organization receives requests from the government to provide policy advice. The organization has participated in the development of policies related to food and agriculture, and some of these documents are the NDS review, national agricultural research, and the CAADP stocktaking review.

### *Statistics, monitoring, and evaluation*

SNAU has a fully functioning M&E system and periodically produces M&E reports for the purposes of learning and redefining programmes. There is adequate capacity for data collection, data processing, and data analysis. The primary clients for the data produced by SNAU are the SACAU secretariat and MoA. Analytical tools used are SPSS Statistics and Excel, and the data generated are used for strategic plan reviews, project design and redesign, and advocacy strategies. The statistics and M&E activities suffer inadequate human capital and inadequate funding for regular data collection.

### *Constraints and solutions*

Fewer staff are available than required, and there is a lack of funds for research and policy work, and inadequate physical resources. Possible solutions to the mentioned challenges include funding to recruit more staff, government support to farmer organizations, and mobilization of funds to acquire physical resources.

### **3.3.2.2. TechnoServe–Swaziland**

#### **Human resources**

TechnoServe–Swaziland employs 14 professional staff members (9 male and 5 female). Out of the 14 professionals, 3 are master’s degree holders and 11 undergraduate degree holders. The organization is reported to function well in terms of quality of human capacity, quantity of human capital, management of human capital, and retention and effective utilization of human capital.

#### **Financial resources**

The organization’s financial year runs from 1 July to 30 June of the following year. In the 2011/2012 financial year, TechnoServe worked with an estimated total annual budget of E250,000; the total annual budget was increased to E1,500,000 in the 2012/2013 financial year, with an estimated annual budget of E1,030,000 for financial year 2013/2014. Since the organization is a non-profit-making organization, all income is spent, with a zero balance left on conclusion of each project. Most funds used by the organization are solicited from bilateral and multilateral donors.

#### **Physical resources**

TechnoServe–Swaziland has 20 computers with word processing software but no bibliographic software. The NGO owns 7 vehicles and 3 telephone landlines, and staff can access more than 17 mobile phones. MS Excel software is the most common and is used daily by at least 17 staff members. The Internet at the offices was rated as slow, taking 5–14 seconds to load and about 14–29 seconds to download a document of 1 MB. All the staff members have enough working space.

#### **Research-policy linkage**

TechnoServe–Swaziland has developed at least five projects related to food and agriculture policy. In order of importance, stakeholders are farmers, the private sector, government ministries, and NGOs/CBOs. The organization has conducted at least four public consultations on food and agriculture policy issues. The organization has also conducted policy dialogues in the past two years based on half-day policy dialogues/meetings and one-day workshops/conferences.

The organization participates in discussions on global, regional, and continental issues pertaining to the agriculture and food sector. Global meetings attended include a TechnoServe global meeting and the Youth in Agriculture Summit sponsored by the Centre for Coordination of Agricultural Research and Development for Southern Africa. Personal contact with government officials, small round-table discussions with key stakeholders, and presentations and media to influence government are the common communication tools used. The organization receives direct requests from government policymakers for specific information on food and agriculture issues quarterly. TechnoServe is a valuable source of research, data, and statistics. Policy reports, policy briefs, media briefs, websites or other electronic media, appearances on radio or TV, workshops and conferences, and policy briefs to ministries are all channels of communication of policy results to relevant stakeholders.

#### **Constraints and solutions**

The major constraints that TechnoServe faces are local staff with limited skills, continual dependence on donor funding (local funding is practically non-existent), limited dedicated M&E staffing levels, and limitations with physical facilities.

### 3.3.3. Key issues from individual-level assessments

The following are key issues identified in the individual-level assessments:

1. Quality of human capacity is a major constraint in all organizations; this is exacerbated by the rather limited numbers of professionals in the organizations.
2. Besides being understaffed in the professional staff cadres, staff retention is difficult and this leads to high turnover (attrition) of human resources.
3. Government departments largely depend on the national budget to execute their programmes and plans related to food and agriculture policies. These funds come in the form of recurrent budgets wherein all expenditures are based on specific line items; financial regulations require lengthy treasury negotiations for the transfer of funds across line items. Budgets for capital development are limited and, again, they are allocated for specific items or projects. In essence, policy issues do not have specific budget line items and implementing departments have to seek funding from elsewhere.
4. Parastatal bodies are better placed to conduct policy-related activities. The large parastatal bodies generate sufficient funds from which they can support such activities; the small bodies (such as the Swaziland Cotton Board and SEPARC) do not have such a luxury because they continue to draw support from the government.
5. Most organizations lack or have limited capacity in terms of computer software and hardware; where there is a semblance of computer ware, these tools and equipment are old, outdated, and often so obsolete that current software programs cannot be used. This is the case largely in MoA departments, where a computer, if operating, is shared by different staff, each for a different purpose. DRSS depends on the age-old MSTAT-C statistical analytical program, which is more than 20 years old, and those involved in social research have to depend on SPSS Statistics in the Government Computer Centre for support.
6. M&E is weak in MoA. The Economic Planning and Analysis Section, responsible for this, has long ceased conducting this function. The only MoA department with good and reliable M&E is DVS. Hence, policy implementation is hardly monitored and evaluated, except in DVS.
7. The parastatal bodies and NGOs studied have in place sufficiently elaborate infrastructure to monitor and evaluate their programmes. A major reason for this success is that their principals require regular M&E reporting.
8. The quality and quantity of human capital for handling policy research-related activities involving the use of analytical software, data entry, and data analysis is very limited, as indeed are funds to carry out such research activities.
9. Regional and international research-policy linkages are present with UN agencies such as the FAO and various CGIAR centres such as CIMMYT, IITA, and ARC.
10. Limited information was gathered on policymaking capacity, although organizations are trying to participate in the country's policymaking and implementing processes; capacity, however, is limited.
11. Finally, many institutions lack sufficient physical office space to facilitate operations. The infrastructure at DRSS is dilapidated and does not provide much confidence in its products.

### 3.3.4. Recommendations to address the capacity gaps in policy analysis and monitoring and evaluation

**TABLE 3.3: RECOMMENDATIONS ADDRESSING POLICY ANALYSIS AND M&E CAPACITY GAPS**

Policy issue	Recommendation
<p>Food and agriculture policies enacted in Swaziland had limited stakeholder involvement and thus were not well appreciated and understood by most stakeholders. It is thus barely possible to monitor and evaluate them. Stakeholder consultation was merely consultative.</p>	<p>The government and ministry of agriculture (MoA) need to educate all stakeholders about these policies to give a basis for easy implementation and monitoring and evaluation (M&amp;E). Future policy enactments should be as inclusive as possible to ensure buy-in by stakeholders.</p>
<p>MoA is slow in reviewing, enacting, and implementing policies that directly or indirectly affect food and agriculture, such as land policies, seed policies, agricultural extension services policies, and agrochemical use policies, among others. This hinders investment in food and agriculture-related businesses</p>	<p>The government and MoA should speed up review and implementation of the many food and agriculture-related policies.</p> <p>Where necessary, MoA should repeal or amend policies, or generate new ones.</p>
<p>Human resource capacity gaps have been identified in all institutions studied</p>	<p>MoA and other organizations should recruit the personnel required to manage the policy analysis and M&amp;E operations.</p> <p>Personnel responsible for management of the policy analysis and M&amp;E portfolios need to be trained.</p> <p>The different organizations involved in policy analysis and M&amp;E activities should search for technical assistance to provide the necessary capacity building in all personnel.</p>
<p>Existing policies, programmes, and projects are not adequate and there is, to some extent, apathy towards them. Many of these policies and legislation instruments were not appropriately grounded in stakeholders’ needs. They do not provide the required enabling environment for stakeholders.</p>	<p>The Comprehensive Agricultural Sector Policy (2005) is outdated and hardly addresses the current constraints and challenges, which have changed over the last 10 years. MoA urgently needs to formulate a new national agricultural policy and strategy based on current and potential constraints (including climate change and globalization) that will most likely provide the desired enabling environment.</p>
<p>MoA M&amp;E systems have been latent for more than 10 years, probably due to lack of resources. This has made it nearly impossible to assess the impacts of policies. This is made worse by the inability of civil society organizations to carry their mandate into the agriculture sector.</p>	<p>MoA needs to seek funding from the treasury, development partners, or both to re-establish and maintain an M&amp;E unit to provide this function. The establishment of a Swaziland Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System node will provide some relief.</p>

Policy issue	Recommendation
<p>Although there are a myriad of modern and effective tools (software and hardware) to use in policy analysis and M&amp;E operations, most institutions except TechnoServe have not had any perceptible contact with them. What they have are old tools that can barely handle any forms of data.</p>	<p>MoA and other organizations involved in these important policy analysis and M&amp;E operations need to be supported to access modern technology to facilitate operations.</p>

Source: Authors.

## 4. INVESTMENT PLANNING

Through MoA, the government of Swaziland developed SNAIP as an instrument to guide agricultural investments and coordinate implementation with all stakeholders in the sector. SNAIP mainly targets investment in natural resource management, market access, food security, research and extension, and knowledge management, all of which are key CAADP pillars (Swaziland, MoA 2013). SNAIP is a product of the Maputo Declaration, a CAADP initiative supported by the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and regional economic communities. The CAADP proposed processes follow resolutions made by African leaders to allocate at least 10 per cent of their national budgets to agricultural investment to achieve the desired 6 per cent annual growth of AgGDP. Swaziland entered into CAADP in 2007, resulting in the compilation of the Swaziland CAADP compact of 2010. This compact was endorsed by all stakeholders in the agriculture sector, including the government, development partners, the private sector, farmers, NGOs, and CBOs.

According to MoA, the institutional framework related to the agriculture sector is important in implementing policies and agricultural investment (Swaziland, MoA 2014). The institutional framework includes the Prime Minister's Office and central government agencies including MEPD, mainly responsible for high-level policy direction; the Ministry of Finance, mainly centred on budgetary control; and the Ministry of Public Service, responsible for management of human resources. All the aforementioned ministries influence the direction and the operations of MoA. Other ministries where agricultural investment can be apportioned include the Ministry of Natural Resources and Energy, responsible for management of water and land resources and energy; the Ministry of Tourism and Environmental Affairs, responsible for forestry; the Ministry of Health, supporting food and nutrition security; the Ministry of Public Works, responsible for infrastructure development; and the Ministry of Tinkhundla Administration and Development, responsible for community development and management of Swazi Nation land (SNL).

The endorsement process, implementation, and M&E of food and agriculture-related policies in Swaziland is relatively slow, an indication of gaps and limited capacity for agricultural investment analysis to inform budgeting and operational planning in a timely manner. The gaps and needs identified include limited human capacity; limited physical resources; and limited funds to carry out research, data management, and use of economic models to formulate policies and to monitor and evaluate activities related to food and agriculture policies for feedback relevant to investment planning and budgeting. Second, MoA is allocated economists by MEPD, and the officers are thought to have the ability to work as M&E officers/specialists; however, their acquired knowledge on the job may not contribute much to the ministry's long-term goals because MEPD has the power to easily relocate the officers. These MEPD officers are available only at the pleasure of the chief economist.

As in other countries, a major underlying challenge that MoA faces is limited capacity to conduct investment planning and to conduct analysis to generate economic models that would inform investment planning. Finally, besides the unreliable presence of experienced economists, there are issues of limited physical and financial resources and human capacity as well as limited government funding that supports only the recurrent budget, leaving little money for some projects that heavily rely on capital investment. All these challenges limit the flow of information important in informing agricultural investment budgets and planning.

## 4.1. Recommendations to enhance capacity for investment planning

- There is a need to develop and strengthen human capacities among all professional staff of MoA in skills related to research, M&E, and management of knowledge support systems. In addition, MoA should attempt to seek economists with longer tenure in the M&E department to develop methods and tools and to collect and analyse relevant data for M&E policy and for public investment in support of agricultural development as well as to generate useful information needed in the formulation of investment budgets and planning.
- The SNAIP team members and the political personnel involved in decision-making related to investment in food and agriculture projects should be trained on project management and M&E. This may quicken the processing of making appropriate decisions to select projects that meet the immediate needs of farmers, such as irrigation, development of all-inclusive value chains of different agricultural products, and research and innovation.
- The government should facilitate the establishment of more private-public partnerships, donor-public partnerships, NGO-public partnerships, and farmer association–government partnerships, which greatly contribute to the reduction of government expenditure and acquisition of the physical resources and expertise needed to enhance the capacity for investment planning. These partnerships are also important in easing the flow of information and gathering feedback important in formulating future agricultural investments.

## 5. KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT

Knowledge management ensures that knowledge both in people's memory (tacit knowledge) and in tangible assets (explicit knowledge) are used to the fullest within and between organizations. Knowledge management is, therefore, a process of capturing, developing, sharing, and effectively using organizational knowledge. It relates to a multidisciplinary approach to achieving organizational objectives by making the best use of knowledge. According to Koenig (2012), knowledge management is a discipline that promotes an integrated approach to identifying, capturing, evaluating, retrieving, and sharing all of an enterprise's information assets. These assets may include databases, documents, policies, procedures, and previously uncaptured expertise and experience in individual workers.

Based on the above understanding of knowledge management, responses reveal that the focus on knowledge management is limited and is not well organized within and outside the ministry. Proper information management is a cornerstone in the M&E of progress being achieved in agricultural development and for subsequent reporting to the local and international communities. In addition, it is critical in linking farmers and stakeholder communities to each other and to markets. Recognizing these facts, SNAIP observed that the underdevelopment of the sector was "also" due to poor information management (Swaziland, MoA 2014).

MoA lacks an integrated agricultural information system. The elaborate agricultural information system established in the 1980s deteriorated and eventually became a photocopy shop as budgetary support declined following the conclusion of the Swaziland Cropping Systems Research and Extension Training Project (1982). Indeed, responses from the MoA institutions revealed a lack of reporting and analytical software and hardware to facilitate operations. Whatever software and hardware may be available have rapidly become obsolete. SNAIP adds that the lack of knowledge and actual management systems also results in weak early warning systems, with whatever information may be available not readily accessible or disseminated adequately and efficiently (Swaziland, MoA 2014). This is not unexpected with the present MoA Information Unit in such a poor state of service. The conclusion reached is that for progress, especially in light of CAADP engagement, a robust information system is particularly critical for MoA as the lead institution for food and nutrition security. An effective communication strategy is critical in coordinating the different stakeholder institutions and stakeholders involved in complementary activities that reinforce agricultural development and food and nutrition security policy (Swaziland, MoA 2014).

Knowledge management facilitates the systematic capturing, analysing, organizing, disseminating, and sharing of knowledge with a view to making it productive and usable. Based on survey responses, the major routes used in the harvesting, use, and exchange of knowledge among stakeholders are (1) personal contacts; (2) round-table discussions, including workshops and seminars; (3) policy briefs; (4) mass media (hardly used in civil service organizations unless sanctioned but popular with NGOs and CBOs, and to a limited extent, parastatal bodies); (5) and panel discussions (albeit occasionally).

Major challenges in the use of these approaches to knowledge management are availability of staff quality and numbers; access to reporting and analytical facilities and financing to support these activities; and lack of physical capacity to process, disseminate, and distribute information.

A major government drive has to be to promote information management and effective communication strategies by all ministries through e-governance processes. If backed with the requisite enabling environment, this would be a very effective route for promoting knowledge management in all sectors, including the agriculture sector. Second, according to SNAIP, the lack of an information system calls for the establishment of a knowledge management system linked to national, regional, and international partners; such an initiative would be a vital support framework in the coordination of all national aspirations that aim to promote food and nutrition security (Swaziland, MoA 2014).

## **5.1. Recommendations to enhance the capacity for investment planning**

1. The focus on knowledge management and indeed the whole process of systematic capturing, analysing, organizing, disseminating, and sharing knowledge is weak. It is recommended that MoA and institutions affiliated with the ministry establish training opportunities for staff to enable them to capture and process information that would sequentially lead to improved knowledge management systems.
2. An elaborate information and knowledge unit was established in the early 1980s; this unit ceased operations in the 1990s and remains merely a photocopy shop. As a matter of urgency, MoA should seek the necessary funding to re-establish this unit, giving it the required infrastructure, tools, and equipment.
3. MoA should establish an adequate staff complement to effectively work on knowledge management.

## 6. PROPOSED CAPACITY-STRENGTHENING RECOMMENDATIONS AND STRATEGIES

This study identified several areas needing attention if the quality, utility, and content of food and agriculture policy analysis and investment planning, M&E, and knowledge management are to be effectively addressed. Hence, based on responses from the different organizations, the following issues are critical.

1. All organizations identified funding as a major source of concern because all subsequent activities depend on funding. Public-sector funding is itemized, and moving funds from one vote or centre to another is against financial regulations. The same may be said of NGOs and parastatal bodies. Without additional and unattached funding, policy analysis, investment planning, M&E, and knowledge management will continue to be afterthought activities.
2. Organizations lack pools of professional staff that can readily be deployed to deal with policy analysis, investment planning, M&E, and knowledge management. The limited number of professional staff established at any given organization have their own responsibilities for which they were employed. In any case, even when available staff are deployed on these issues of food and agriculture development, they most likely to lack the necessary capacity, skills, and knowledge to handle data collection, analysis, and reporting. This issue will no doubt constrain the use of evidence-based analysis for input into priority setting.
3. Within MoA, sector performance tracking is adequate only for livestock. For the other subsectors, M&E is largely absent. This makes it difficult to generate the necessary evidence for use in policy research. MoA needs to revive its previous structure and assign it the M&E portfolio, which has been lacking and is proving detrimental to MoA operations.
4. Most institutions surveyed lack suitable physical facilities, including computer hardware and software, office space, and other tools and equipment. This is a major issue, especially given the state of the various tools, equipment, software, and hardware—old and obsolete. Success will come only when these shortcomings are addressed.
5. Knowledge management and information exchange are little known in the different organizations. The elaborate agricultural information system established in the 1980s deteriorated, and eventually its functioning degenerated into a photocopying shop. These facilities need to be re-established and the necessary capacity developed if information management is to be effective and progress in M&E is to be achieved (Swaziland, MoA 2014).
6. SNAU is attempting to build the capacity of farmers to understand and participate in policy dialogue. These attempts need to be embraced, thereby ensuring that the main stakeholder and recipient of agricultural outputs is well versed in policies and investment planning.

## 7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This capacity needs assessment was undertaken to collect data from key institutions involved in food and agriculture policy processes; the data collected are to inform the subsequent capacity-strengthening strategy for Swaziland that addresses the needs of the CAADP implementation processes.

The study was based on three levels—policy, organization, and individual. The data collection was based on a ReSAKSS questionnaire/instrument. It was operationalized through key informant interviews with different organizations. Initially, 24 organizations were identified for the study. Unfortunately, only 8 positively responded. Some of the key issues and recommendations distilled from the responses are outlined below.

1. The many existing agriculture policies are not adequate in dealing with the many problems, constraints, and challenges that the sector faces during this millennium, including low productivity, climate change and variability, globalization, and the loss of the country's AGOA eligibility, to mention but a few. Worse still, the sector lacks an overarching agriculture-sector development policy and strategy that would coordinate and address needs and deliver improved productivity, exports, and employment. It is recommended that MoA develop a new national agriculture-sector policy to replace CASP, revisit and implement policies and plans, and establish M&E mechanisms for each policy.
2. The policy development in MoA has improved; it has increasingly become more participatory than in the past. Major problems remain, including the lack of a policy implementer and actual farmers' participation at the different policymaking levels and stages. Stakeholders, despite the better enabling environment, have remained apprehensive and non-committal because they do not believe the sincerity of MoA. It is recommended that the ministry fully institutionalize stakeholder-level participation at the different levels of food and agriculture policy development.
3. M&E in the ministry is weak. Its presence and efficacy have experienced a constant decline since the 1990s. MoA, however, regularly reports to the Cabinet and Parliament on progress being made on different food and agriculture policy processes, but such information remains classified and hence not open to scrutiny. Thus, the extent to which policies are monitored in the ministry remains modest. It is recommended that MoA re-establish an effective, efficient, vibrant, and user-friendly system to monitor changes in policy outputs, outcomes, and impacts.
4. The organization-level analysis revealed that (1) most institutions showed leadership to be neutral or average; (2) staff motivation was low; (4) MoA M&E processes were weak and somewhat inefficient in influencing policy; (5) access to information was low; and (6) though strategic plans were in place, funding was limited. To achieve an operational-level capacity, the above issues need to be addressed.
5. The individual organization assessments, covering the status of human resources, financing, and policy analysis capabilities, confirmed the conclusions of the organizational assessment, with most institutions reporting limited funding, low staff numbers and quality, physical constraints, and constrained staff knowledge and skills. A critical recommendation is that the major capacity gaps be filled or, rather, developed.

### 7.1. Study limitations

1. The instruments were not validated for Swaziland and thus could not be easily and readily fitted to specific stakeholder needs or contexts. This may have reduced the accuracy of the findings or caused some confusion during interviews.

Questionnaires were administered as they were written, with researchers offering oral guidance during interviews.

2. Some of the institutions that eventually agreed to participate in the study deliberately refrained from responding to particular items in the questionnaire, such as capacity of leadership; in certain instances, information sought in instruments was perceived to be strictly confidential.

Confidentiality was stressed to respondents to assure them that anonymity procedures would be followed.

3. Heads of institutions were very difficult to reach. Most cited lack of time; others were frightened by the size of the instrument. Many of these dropped out despite pleas for some responses. The Excel instrument was frighteningly long and sought lot of details that called for several departments and people to participate.

Consultants were in constant contact with institutions to offer assistance and track progress.

4. Institutions failed to complete instruments within the given time frame. Many institutions dropped out and could not be included in this report.

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# APPENDICES

## Appendix 1 Specific Terms of Reference

1. Assessing the existing capacity for strategic policy analysis and investment planning at the country level involved identifying key individuals within the agricultural sector or close associates who contribute to the generation of evidence for policymaking in the sector. The assessment used the following methods:
  - a. Key informant interviews to assess the need for human capacity in terms of total number of professionals and their qualifications needed for strategic policy analysis, M&E, and knowledge management and sharing
  - b. Formal instruments to identify the existing human capacity in the organizations involved in policy research and analysis, M&E, and knowledge management and sharing
  - c. Identification of capacity gaps by compilation and analysis of data disaggregated by gender, educational attainment, and area of specialization
  - d. Development of a baseline database on individual capacities, including people's education, training, and experience, for each organization, which will be used for periodic monitoring of progress made towards implementing the capacity-strengthening strategy
2. Assessing organizational capacity and identifying areas for improving the quality and utility of agricultural policy analysis, investment planning, implementation, and M&E, including strengthening organizations' capacity to produce periodic reports on the performance of the agricultural sector, included assessment of the following:
  - a. Developing an annotated list (including a map showing linkages) of the roles and responsibilities of the major state and non-state organizations involved in strategic policy analysis, investment planning, M&E, and knowledge management and sharing
  - b. Assessing the existing organizational capacity for strategic policy analysis, investment planning, M&E, and knowledge management and sharing, and identifying areas for strengthening efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability
  - c. Assessing the existing data and M&E systems related to tracking implementation of CAADP processes, and identifying areas for strengthening the systems for effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability
  - d. Assessing the existing contents and knowledge management systems related to agricultural and rural development, and identifying areas for strengthening the systems for their effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability
3. For assessing the institutional and capacity constraints in the policy process related to CAADP implementation (including development and implementation of investment plans) with particular reference to effective use of evidence (including policy analysis results and M&E data) in policy and programme design and in investment planning, specific activities and outputs included the following:
  - a. Through discussions with key informants, developing a network map of major decision makers in the agriculture and rural development sectors (such as ministers, principal secretaries, directors, members of Parliament, federal executive councils, state governors, other Cabinet members, donors, and so on), their roles, and their levels of influence

- b. Assessing the demand for policy analysis results, M&E data, and other forms of knowledge by various players and actors in the policy process; identifying the cycle of major agriculture and rural development—related events, policy discussions, and planning processes (such as budget preparation and so on), as well as key M&E data and policy analysis used and demanded
  - c. Assessing how evidence-based information is used by policymakers and for what purposes
  - d. Analysing the current institutional and capacity constraints in the policy process that impede the design and implementation of investment plans; identifying specific opportunities for strengthening the policy process
4. Based on the above three levels of assessment across the three themes, developing a capacity-strengthening strategy for the country SAKSS will include, but is not limited to, the following:
- a. Identifying specific capacity-strengthening activities and opportunities for strengthening the individual, organizational, and policy process capacity with particular reference to the components and structure or architecture of the country SAKSS, such as the coordination team, network, and members (institutions and key individuals), host institution(s), and governance structure and members.
  - b. Relating the capacity-strengthening activities identified to the roles and responsibilities of the individuals and organizations involved in strategic policy analysis, M&E, development and implementation of investment plans, and knowledge management
  - c. Making suggestions on how individual capacities could be effectively used by the country SAKSS
  - d. Developing an initial capacity-strengthening work plan for the SAKSS, including inputs, outputs, and expected outcomes, as well as the roles and responsibilities of different actors to be involved.

## **Appendix 2: Capacity Assessment of the Policy Process Institutions**

### **Interview Schedule**

This interview will be carried out by the study researcher. Chairpersons and heads of the policy process institutions will be interviewed.

For the purposes of this study, policy process institutions include organizations, committees, councils, boards, task forces, associations, networks, and other similar groups that participate in food and agricultural policymaking processes in the country. They could be formal institutions set up by the public sector, such as Parliamentary committees; by the private sector, such as agribusiness associations; or by civil society organizations, such as food security networks or farmers' associations. Any informal groups that participate in the policy process should be explored and interviewed as well.

Purpose of the interview: To carry out an assessment of the capacity of the institutions involved in the policy process. This interview is expected to take one to one and a half hours.

The focus of the interview will be on the core capabilities of the policy process institutions. Each capability is assessed with a selected number of indicators. Ask the interviewee to reflect on the organization's strengths and weaknesses in relation to each of the underlined indicators. Following the assessment of each capability, ask the interviewee to describe where and how support for institutional and individual capacities is needed. Record their responses under Suggestions for improvement. Last, score the organization based on the scale provided, for each indicator.

General Information			
1.1 Name of the institution / organization / committee / council / board / task force / association / network (herein referred to as your organization):			
1.2 Name of the evaluator:			
1.3 Date and time of the interview:			
1.4 Location of the interview:			
1.5 Name and contact details:			
1.6 What is your function / role / job title in the organization:			
1.7. List below the name / gender / education / current occupation of the other members of your organization / committee / council / board / task force / association / network:			
Name	Gender	Education	Occupation
1.			
2.			
3.			
4.			
6.			
7.			
8. (add more as needed)			
1.8 Since when has your institution participated in / supported the policy process in the food and agriculture sector?			
1.9 Since when have you personally been involved with this organization?			
1.10 In general, what are your impressions about the role of this organization in the policy process?			
1.11 List the institutions and committees in the country that play a similar role in the policy process in the food and agriculture sector (please list ALL those mentioned by the interviewee):			
1. _____			
2. _____			
3. _____			
1.12 List the policies/strategies that were developed in the last five years with the involvement of your organization, and the corresponding policy strategy/document that was produced.			
1. _____			
2. _____			
3. _____			

**I. Capability to act and commit—level of effective leadership in the policy process:**

**1. Leadership is responsive, inspiring, and sensitive.** (How would you describe the political leadership of the food and agriculture sector? This refers to the leadership in government policymaking [minister of agriculture, prime minister, president, or whoever leads the policy process of the sector]. Strong leadership is defined as being goal driven, strategic, and operational.)

Strengths:
Weaknesses:
Suggestions for improvement:
Score: 1. Highly responsive; 2. Responsive; 3. Neutral; 4. Non-responsive; 5. Highly non-responsive

**2. Leaders of the policy process organizations provide appropriate strategic guidance (strategic leader and/or operational leader).** (To what extent does the leader[s] provide strategic direction to the members of the organization? This refers to all leaders of the political organizations engaged in the policy process—parliamentary committees, food security task forces, policymaking mechanisms and bodies.)

Strengths:
Weaknesses:
Suggestions for improvement:
Score: 1. Highly responsive; 2. Responsive; 3. Neutral; 4. Non-responsive; 5. Highly non-responsive

**3. Member or staff turnover in your organization is relatively low.** (Explain the frequency of membership/staff turnover in the organization being interviewed, and the reason for its frequency.)

Strengths:
Weaknesses:
Suggestions for improvement:
Score: 1. Strongly agree; 2. Agree; 3. Neutral; 4. Disagree; 5. Strongly disagree

**4. Members and staff of your organization have the necessary skills to use evidence for strategic analysis and other policy-related work.** (Do members/staff have the skills necessary to effectively use the available evidence and knowledge to engage in policy discussions and dialogues? What skills might they need?)

Strengths:
Weaknesses:
Suggestions for improvement:
Score: 1. Highly skilled; 2. Skilled; 3. Average; 4. Low-skilled; 5. Very low-skilled

**5. Appropriate incentives are in place to sustain member/staff motivation.** (What makes members/staff want to contribute to common food and agricultural policy goals? Incentives could be financial, non-financial, awards, recognition, gaining prestige, ability to influence policies, and so on)

Strengths:
Weaknesses:
Suggestions for improvement:
Score: 1. Very high; 2. High; 3. Average; 4. Low; 5. Very low

**6. There is adequate funding from multiple sources to cover the cost of operations.** (How diversified are the funding sources of the organization over time? How has the level of funding changed over time? Does the funding cover all of your organization’s costs?)

Strengths:
Weaknesses:
Suggestions for improvement:
Score: 1. Highly Adequate; 2. Adequate; 3. Neutral; 4. Low; 5. Very low

**II. Capability to adapt, learn, and self-renew—level of effective application of monitoring and evaluation (M&E)**

**7. Activities, outputs, outcomes, and performance markers are effectively assessed through M&E activities to address the goals of the food and agriculture sector’s programmes and policies.** (What does the sector-level M&E system look at? What type of information does your organization get? At the individual level? Project level? Organizational level?)

Strengths:
Weaknesses:
Suggestions for improvement:
Score: 1. Highly effective; 2. Effective; 3. Neutral; 4. Ineffective; 5. Very ineffective

**8. Sector reviews are performed and other research evidence is collected to effectively assess the effects of delivered products and services (outcomes) for future strategy making.** (What type of information does the organization seek and use to make decisions? Does it come from your own reviews or from commissioned research? Does M&E information influence strategic planning and modification of policies and programmes?)

Strengths:
Weaknesses:
Suggestions for improvement:
Score: 1. Highly effective; 2. Effective; 3. Neutral; 4. Ineffective; 5. Very ineffective

**9. Internal management and evaluation of your organization stimulates frequent critical reflection that results in learning from mistakes.** (Do members/staff talk formally about changes to the policies and programmes in the food and agriculture sector? If so, how frequent are these meetings? Are members/staff comfortable raising issues that reflect poorly on the government?)

Strengths:
Weaknesses:
Suggestions for improvement:
Score: 1. Highly effective; 2. Effective; 3. Neutral; 4. Ineffective; 5. Very ineffective

**10. Members/staff of your organization feel free to come up with ideas for implementation of agricultural policy objectives.** (Do members/staff feel that ideas that they bring up for implementation of the programme are welcomed, discussed, and effectively used in the policymaking process?)

Strengths:
Weaknesses:
Suggestions for improvement:
Score: 1. Highly effective; 2. Effective; 3. Neutral; 4. Ineffective; 5. Very ineffective

**11. Your organization has an effective system to stay in touch with general trends and developments in the food and agriculture sector.** (How does your organization know what is happening in the sector and how does your organization respond to this information?)

Strengths:
Weaknesses:
Suggestions for improvement:
Score: 1. Highly effective; 2. Effective; 3. Neutral; 4. Ineffective; 5. Very ineffective

**12. Your organization is effective in being open and responsive to its stakeholders and the general public.** (What mechanisms does your organization have to obtain input from stakeholders? How is such information processed and what does your organization do with that input?)

Strengths:
Weaknesses:
Suggestions for improvement:
Score: 1. Highly effective; 2. Effective; 3. Neutral; 4. Ineffective; 5. Very ineffective

**III. Capability to deliver on mandate and development objectives—extent to which your organization delivers on planned objectives and mandates**

**13. Your organization has clear operational plans to carry out its mandate and objectives, which all members/staff fully understand.** (Does each mandate and objective have an operational work plan and budget? Do members/staff apply this plan in their day-to-day operations?)

Strengths:
Weaknesses:
Suggestions for improvement:
Score: 1. Strongly agree; 2. Agree; 3. Neutral; 4. Disagree; 5. Strongly disagree

**14. Your organization delivers its planned outputs in a timely fashion.** (Are staff able to carry out your organization’s operational plans? Why or why not?)

Strengths:
Weaknesses:
Suggestions for improvement:
Score: 1. Strongly agree; 2. Agree; 3. Neutral; 4. Disagree; 5. Strongly disagree

**15. Your organization has mechanisms in place to verify that its services meet client, stakeholder, or beneficiary needs.** (How does your organization know that its services are meeting client, stakeholder, or beneficiary needs?)

Strengths:
Weaknesses:
Suggestions for improvement:
Score: 1. Strongly agree; 2. Agree; 3. Neutral; 4. Disagree; 5. Strongly disagree

**IV. Capability to coordinate and relate—level of engagement of your organization in networks, alliances, and collaborative efforts**

**16. Your organization maintains effective coordination with its partner organizations and stakeholder groups for the benefit of the food and agriculture sector.** (Does your organization engage external groups in developing their policies and strategies? If so, how? Does your organization effectively coordinate all members’ roles and make them accountable through continuous interactions?)

Strengths:
Weaknesses:
Suggestions for improvement:
Score: 1. Strongly agree; 2. Agree; 3. Neutral; 4. Disagree; 5. Strongly disagree

**17. Your organization effectively maintains relationships with existing networks/alliances/partnerships.** (What networks/alliances/partnerships does your organization engage in and why? Are they domestic or international? What do they do together, and how do they do it?)

Strengths:
Weaknesses:
Suggestions for improvement:
Score: 1. Highly effective; 2. Effective; 3. Neutral; 4. Ineffective; 5. Very ineffective

**V. Capability to achieve policy and strategy coherence—existence of mechanisms for coherence in the food and agriculture sector**

**18. Vision, mission, and strategies are regularly discussed within your organization.** (Is there a vision, mission, and strategy for the functioning of your organization? How often does your organization discuss/revise its vision, mission, and strategies? Who is involved in this process?)

Strengths:
Weaknesses:
Suggestions for improvement:
Score: 1. Strongly agree; 2. Agree; 3. Neutral; 4. Disagree; 5. Strongly disagree

**19. Operational guidelines to achieve policy and strategy coherence in the food and agriculture sector are in place and the organization effectively follows them to achieve coherence by working with the members and stakeholders.** (Are there operational guidelines? What are they? How are they used?)

Strengths:
Weaknesses:
Suggestions for improvement:
Score: 1. Strongly agree; 2. Agree; 3. Neutral; 4. Disagree; 5. Strongly disagree

**Any other issues that come up:**

**Thank you very much for your cooperation!**

## **Appendix 3 Communication with the principal secretary**

The Principal Secretary  
Ministry of Agriculture  
P. O. Box 162  
Mbabane

2nd October 2014

Dear Sir

### **Request for clearance to conduct a Capacity Needs Assessment prior to the establishment of a country (Swaziland) Strategic Agricultural Knowledge Support System (SAKSS)**

I have been requested by the Regional Strategic Agricultural Knowledge Support System–Southern Africa (ReSAKSS-SA) to conduct a Capacity Needs survey of major institutions in the agriculture sector. This survey will assist ReSAKSS-SA to formulate a capacity-strengthening strategy for the country prior to the establishment of Swaziland SAKSS node.

This need arises from the position that as the CAADP processes progress, the need to improve the quality of policy and strategy planning and implementation also increases. This is particularly necessary with the anticipated accelerated growth and progress towards the CAADP goals. The attached terms of reference provide greater details of what this exercise entails.

Some of the institutions for which capacity needs data would be important are:

#### **MINISTRY**

1. MoA—Department of Agriculture
2. MoA—Department of Veterinary Services and Livestock Development
3. MoA—Department of Research and Specialist Services
4. MoA—Department of Land Development
5. MoA—Department of Fisheries
6. MoA—Department of Economic Planning
7. MoA—Department of Home Economics
8. MoA—Seed Quality Control
9. Forestry Department

## **PARASTATAL BODIES**

10. MEPD/SEPARC
11. SWADE (LUSIP & KDDP)
12. NMC
13. Dairy Board
14. Cotton Board
15. Faculty of Agriculture dean
16. SEPARC

## **CIVIL SOCIETY**

17. Swazi Bank
18. FINCORP
19. SNAU
20. FINCORP
21. TechnoServe
22. ACAT
23. World Vision

For this survey to be carried out expeditiously, your clearance is requested before it can proceed. The relevant documentation as well as a sample of the expected output is attached for your review.

Yours faithfully

John Pali-Shikhulu



MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE  
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**SWAZILAND**

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DATE : 12/11/2014

**Mr. John Pali-Shikhulu,  
RESKASS Consultant.**

Dear Sir


**RE: Clearance to Conduct Capacity Needs Assessment on the Establishment  
of a Country Strategic Agricultural Knowledge Support System (SAKSS).**

Your letter dated 2<sup>nd</sup> October 2014 refers.

You are kindly advised that the ministry authorizes you to conduct the mentioned assessment.

It is the ministry belief that you will keep it apprised of the results of this consultancy as it believes that the results will assist the country as it progresses with the CAADP Process.

Yours faithfully,

  
**B.S. Masuku**  
**Acting Principal Secretary**

# CEOS WANT CIRCULAR NO.4 OF

## ... government agrees to once off-payment but CEOs not pleased

**BY SHISO SIRANDZI**  
**M**BABANE - Chief Executive officers (CEOs) of the 50 Category A parastatals want Circular No.4 of 2013 to be reviewed so that they could benefit from annual cost of living adjustment.

Currently, CEOs, chief financial officers (CFOs) and executive management are not entitled to cost of living adjustment like the rest of their staff.

According to the 2013 Circular, CEOs, CFOs and executive managers' salaries are capped using the total assets as per audited financial statements, experience required, staff complement, professional qualification required, sector of operation, complexity of the job, reliance on government funding and risk. After the implementation of the circular, it transpired that a number of public enterprises, CEOs, CFOs and executive management had reached the higher limit of the PEU Circular on pay packages and therefore unable to implement the cost of living adjustment hence the approval of the once-off payment package.

One CEO, who elected to speak on condition of anonymity, said the circular was affecting the productivity and competitiveness of the parastatals.

The CEO said due to the capping of their salaries, CFOs and executive managers, they (CEOs) were now struggling to get people with the required skills as many were not willing to apply for jobs in the institutions because of the unattractive pay.

The CEO further said a number of public enterprises are experiencing an exodus of qualified

and experienced staff.

"We tried to bring it to the attention of the Minister of Finance Martin Dlamini that the remuneration criteria used for CEOs, CFOs and executive management is causing problems. We are finding it difficult to retain or attract qualified staff hence we end up employing someone for the sake of filling a vacancy," the CEO said. An executive manager in one of the parastatals said: "Due to Circular No.4 of 2013, we have challenges when recruiting people to fill executive positions, a problem we have had for the past two years. Lower level employees are now reluctant to apply for executive positions because they will be later deprived of the cost of living adjustment they are currently enjoying," the CEO said. The executive manager went on to say that the circular was restrictive in that all remuneration and benefits (medical aid, housing and transport) including gratuity are included in the total package of the executive.

"In essence, the remuneration system does not provide for terminal benefits for the executive management." Regarding cost-of-living adjustments, the manager said executive managers were restricted due to the salary ceilings set by the circular resulting in the reduction of their disposable income.

"Not to give employees 'major' is totally against labour practice. The bare minimum one can give an employee is inflation related cost of living adjustment. The affected categories had no incre-

ment for years as government around the clock to solve it," the manager said.

Information reaching the Swazi News is that all the 50 CEOs and Board of Directors met the Minister of Finance, Martin Dlamini, a fortnight ago, where issues including the once-off payments were raised and discussed. Apart from this, the Swazi News understands that the minister's main message was to encourage the CEO and Board chairpersons to improve their productivity of their companies so that they would be able to pay dividends to government as per the policy. The Dividend Policy of 2015 requires Category A profit-making enterprises to pay dividend to government. Dividends can be paid directly into the government account at the Treasury Department. Of the 50 enterprises, only three pay dividends. Concerns over CEOs, CFOs and executive management salaries started very back in 2010. It was when the PEU issued Circular No.3 of 2010 titled "Controls on Parastatals' Pay Packages".

That circular directed that CEO, CFOs and executive management salaries be based on assets of the public enterprises instead of including other factors that are normally considered when grading positions.

The major challenge was that when the Circular continued being implemented, it turned out that some heads of departments' total pay packages were higher than those of their CEOs or CFOs.

Guideline for maximum pay packages for Category A public Enterprises as per Circular No.4 of 2013. This means the CEO packages including basic salary, gratuity and allowances cannot exceed the band package in this table.

Group	BAND TOTAL PACKAGE Amount on the right is calling CEOs cannot exceed	PUBLIC ENTERPRISE
A	E1 060 000 - E1 242 000	Swaziland Railway UNISWA SRA
B	E1 040 000 - below E1 219 000	
C	E1 020 000 - below E1 196 000	SEC SPTC SWSC
D	E1 000 000 - below E1 173 000	
E	E980 000 - below E1 150 000	
Group 2	E960 000 - below E1 127 000	
A	E940 000 - below E1 104 000	SNPF SNHB
B	E920 000 - below E1 081 000	
C	E900 000 - below E1 058 000	
D	E880 000 - below E1 035 000	
Group 3	E860 000 - below E1 012 000	SWACAA
A	E840 000 - below E989 000	
B	E820 000 - below E966 000	
C	E800 000 - below E943 000	FINCORP
D	E780 000 - below E920 000	
Group 4	E760 000 - below E897 000	
A	E740 000 - below E874 000	MVA
B	E720 000 - below E851 000	
C	E700 000 - below E828 000	
D	E680 000 - below E805 000	SWADE SGSH
Group 5	E660 000 - below E782 000	
A	E640 000 - below E759 000	GMAC, SCC, SEA SIPA, SMTG, STVA SWASA
B	E620 000 - below E736 000	NERCHA
C	E600 000 - below E713 000	NAMBOARD, PHHC
D	E580 000 - below E690 000	RSMAC, STA

# ReSAKSS

Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System

Facilitated by IFPRI 

Established in 2006, the Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (ReSAKSS) supports evidence and outcome-based planning and implementation of agricultural-sector policies and strategies in Africa. In particular, ReSAKSS offers high-quality analyses and knowledge products to improve policymaking, track progress, and facilitate policy dialogue, benchmarking, review and mutual learning processes of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) implementation agenda. The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) facilitates the overall work of ReSAKSS working in partnership with the African Union Commission (AUC), the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA), and leading regional economic communities (RECs). At the regional level, ReSAKSS is supported by Africa-based CGIAR centers: the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) in Kenya, International Water Management Institute (IWMI) in South Africa, and International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) in Nigeria. [www.resakss.org](http://www.resakss.org).

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