



CHAPTER 13

# Tracking Key CAADP Indicators and Implementation Processes<sup>1</sup>

Wondwosen Tefera, Paul Maina Guthiga, Julia Collins,  
and Tsitsi Makombe

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## Introduction

Recognizing the central role that agriculture plays in development, in 2003, the African heads of state and government launched the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) as a continentwide framework for accelerating broad-based economic growth and progress toward poverty reduction and food and nutrition security. In 2014, African leaders expanded the CAADP agenda by adopting the Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods, outlining seven key commitments for accelerated agricultural growth and transformation. Through the declaration, they pledged to increase investment in agriculture, end hunger and halve poverty by 2025, boost intra-African agricultural trade, enhance resilience to climate variability, and strengthen mutual accountability for actions and results by conducting a continental Biennial Review (BR) of progress made toward achieving the commitments (AUC 2014). They also recommitted to uphold the CAADP principles and values of evidence-based planning, policy efficiency, dialogue, review, accountability, and exploiting regional complementarities as well as to achieve the CAADP targets of 6 percent annual agricultural growth and allocation of at least 10 percent of national budgets to agriculture.

After two decades of implementation, CAADP has undoubtedly raised the profile of African agriculture, mobilized political support for and investments in the agriculture sector, and fostered broad-based participation of both state and nonstate actors in agriculture policy discourse especially through its promotion of mutual accountability (Benin et al. 2018; Ulimwengu et al. 2020). As a result, Africa has seen notable progress in achieving higher economic and agricultural growth, boosting agricultural productivity, reducing hunger and poverty, and expanding agricultural trade (Badiane, Collins, and Ulimwengu 2020). Nevertheless, Africa's performance was stronger during CAADP's first decade (2003–2013) than during its second decade, under the Malabo Declaration (2014–2022), when the continent's performance has been uneven due to a plethora of factors including a global economic slowdown in 2016, the COVID-19 pandemic, effects of the Russia–Ukraine war, the impacts of climate change and pest outbreaks, and growing political conflicts (Collins et al. 2022; Collins, Tefera, and Wambo Yamdjeu 2023).

Therefore, to accelerate agrifood system transformation on the continent and with the Malabo Declaration set to expire at the end of 2024, the African Union Commission (AUC) has been leading an effort to develop a robust, evidence-based post-Malabo CAADP agenda. The effort has included inviting submissions of independent memoranda on key priorities for a post-Malabo agenda from different CAADP stakeholder groups and undertaking broad and inclusive stakeholder regional consultations and analytics to guide the creation of an agenda that will inform a new CAADP Declaration and Action Plan, expected to be adopted by the African heads of state and government in Kampala, Uganda, in January 2025. AKADEMIYA2063 has played a key role in supporting AUC with the agenda development process, including mobilizing technical expertise and content (led by African centers of excellence and supported by global knowledge centers) to guide the development of an evidence-based post-Malabo agenda. More specifically, AKADEMIYA2063 mobilized knowledge centers that convened and led the work of 13 technical working groups (TWGs) in developing thematic technical content for the agenda. AKADEMIYA2063 also assembled a technical review committee made up of eminent African and international development experts to assess the technical rigor of the thematic content developed by the TWGs.

The Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (ReSAKSS), was established in 2006 to provide policy-relevant analysis, data, and tools to support the formulation and implementation of evidence-based agriculture-sector policies and strategies, as well as to enable CAADP policy dialogue, peer review, benchmarking, and mutual learning processes. AKADEMIYA2063 leads the work of ReSAKSS in partnership with AUC, the African Union Development Agency–NEPAD (AUDA-NEPAD), and leading regional economic communities (RECs). Since 2008, ReSAKSS has tracked CAADP implementation progress, initially using the first CAADP monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework (see Benin, Johnson, and Omilola 2010) and then using the CAADP Results Framework (RF) for 2015–2025 (see AUC and NPCA 2015) developed in 2015 to track CAADP progress under the Malabo Declaration.

The CAADP RF is organized on three levels: level 1—outcomes; level 2—outputs; and level 3—inputs:

- Level 1 of the CAADP RF includes relatively broad development outcomes and impacts to which agriculture contributes, including wealth creation;

food and nutrition security; enhanced economic opportunities, poverty alleviation, and shared prosperity; and resilience and sustainability.

- Level 2 includes the outputs from interventions intended to transform the agriculture sector and achieve inclusive growth: improved agricultural production and productivity; increased intra-African trade and functional markets; expanded local agro-industry and value chain development that is inclusive of women and youth; increased resilience of livelihoods and improved management of risks in agriculture; and improved management of natural resources for sustainable agriculture.
- Level 3 includes inputs and processes required to strengthen systemic capacity to deliver CAADP results and create an enabling environment in which agricultural transformation can take place: effective and inclusive policy processes; effective and accountable institutions that regularly assess the quality of implementation of policies and commitments; strengthened capacity for evidence-based planning, implementation, and review; improved multisectoral coordination, partnerships, and mutual accountability in sectors related to agriculture; increased public and private investments in agriculture; and increased capacity to generate, analyze, and use data, information, knowledge, and innovations.

The CAADP RF comprises 38 indicators: 14 for level 1, 12 for level 2, and 12 for level 3 (Table 13.1). ReSAKSS tracks progress on CAADP indicators in the CAADP RF for 2015–2025 through its flagship Annual Trends and Outlook Report (ATOR) and website ([www.resakss.org](http://www.resakss.org)).

Whereas the CAADP RF is designed to help track progress in implementing the Malabo Declaration, the CAADP BR process initiated in 2015 introduced additional indicators specifically aimed at monitoring all seven of the Malabo commitments using the Africa Agriculture Transformation Scorecard (AATS). Twenty-four CAADP BR indicators were drawn from the CAADP RF and new indicators were added during four BR cycles, resulting in a total of 59 BR indicators compared with 38 RF indicators (Table 13.1).

The BR is the paramount continentwide mutual accountability process in the agriculture sector, allowing AU Member States to collectively review progress toward the Malabo goals and commitments. However, the CAADP RF is an important complement to the BR process as its indicators provide context

TABLE 13.1—NUMBER OF INDICATORS IN THE CAADP RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND BIENNIAL REVIEW	
CAADP Results Framework	Number of indicators
Level 1: Agriculture’s contribution to economic growth and inclusive development	14
Level 2: Agricultural transformation and inclusive growth	12
Level 3: Systemic capacity to deliver results	12
<b>Total number of indicators</b>	<b>38</b>
CAADP Biennial Review and Africa Agriculture Transformation Scorecard	Number of indicators
Commitment 1: CAADP processes and values	3
Commitment 2: Investment finance in agriculture	6
Commitment 3: Ending hunger by 2025	26
Commitment 4: Halving poverty by 2025	8
Commitment 5: Boosting intra-African trade in agricultural commodities and services	7
Commitment 6: Enhancing resilience to climate variability	4
Commitment 7: Mutual accountability for results and actions	5
<b>Total number of indicators</b>	<b>59</b>
Source: Authors based on AUC and NPCA (2015) and AUC (2014).	

for BR results and its coverage enables a range of analyses across the continent and over time. This chapter reviews progress on CAADP indicators using the CAADP RF because the RF data assembled by ReSAKSS are consistently available for a larger number of countries and for longer time periods than the BR data, including both pre- and post-CAADP eras (1995–2003 and 2003–2021). This in turn allows for aggregation across countries and an examination of trends over time periods and across different country groupings (for example, organized by economic categories, regional economic communities, and stage of CAADP implementation) that are not considered by the BR. Although the CAADP BR indicators are broader in coverage, there is considerable overlap between those indicators and those in the CAADP RF. Currently, ReSAKSS

tracks progress on 18 CAADP BR indicators that overlap with the CAADP RF indicators it tracks (Table 13.2).

Six other CAADP RF and BR indicators overlap. However, these indicators are not yet included in the ReSAKSS database because the data are not available at all or are not available across all countries to allow for cross-country aggregation. They include indicators on postharvest loss, women’s and children’s dietary adequacy, resilience, sustainable land management, and capacity of statistical systems. Additional data gaps in other areas covered in the CAADP RF, including those on social protection and private sector investment, mean that currently only 27 of the 38 CAADP RF indicators can be tracked (Table 13.2). Although discussions on filling data gaps are underway among CAADP technical partners, increasing the availability of data in these areas can be challenging and will require resolute efforts by countries and their partners to develop and fund comprehensive data collection activities.

## Objectives of the Chapter

In this chapter we review Africa’s progress in CAADP process implementation and on the CAADP RF indicators to highlight areas of strong performance that need to be sustained or accelerated as well as areas of weak performance that require urgent attention to enable the continent to meet its Malabo Declaration agricultural transformation goals. The chapter examines progress on 27 of the 38 CAADP RF indicators for which cross-country data are available (Table 13.2). Details of the indicators and aggregate statistics are available in the data tables in Annexes 1–3 of this report. Progress on the RF indicators is discussed across different aggregated geographic and economic groupings of African countries by comparing trends in the RF indicators during the first five years after the adoption of CAADP (2003–2008) with later subperiods (2008–2014 and 2014–2023), with a particular focus on the Malabo Declaration period of 2014–2023.

**TABLE 13.2—CAADP RESULTS FRAMEWORK INDICATORS DISCUSSED**

<b>Level 1: Agriculture’s Contribution to Economic Growth and Inclusive Development</b>
1. L1.1.1 GDP per capita (constant 2015 US\$)
2. L1.1.2 Household final consumption expenditure per capita (constant 2015 US\$)
3. L1.2.1 Prevalence of undernourishment (% of population)
4. L1.2.2a Prevalence of underweight, weight for age (% of children under 5)
5. L1.2.2b Prevalence of stunting, height for age (% of children under 5)
6. L1.2.2c Prevalence of wasting, weight for height (% of children under 5)
7. L1.2.3 Cereal import dependency index
8. L1.3.1 Employment rate
9. L1.3.3 Poverty gap at \$1.90 a day (2017 PPP)
10. L1.3.4 Extreme poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 a day (2017 PPP), % of population
<b>Level 2: Agricultural Transformation and Sustained Inclusive Agricultural Growth</b>
11. L2.1.1 Agriculture value added (million, constant 2015 US\$)
12. L2.1.2 Agriculture Production Index (2004–2006 = 100)
13. L2.1.3 Agriculture value added per agricultural worker (constant 2015 US\$)
14. L2.1.4 Agriculture value added per hectare of agricultural land (constant 2015 US\$)
15. L2.1.5 Yield for the five most important agricultural commodities
16. L2.2.1 Value of intra-African agricultural trade (constant 2015 US\$, million)
17. L2.4.2 Existence of food reserves, local purchases for relief programs, early warning systems, and school feeding programs
<b>Level 3: Strengthening Systemic Capacity to Deliver Results</b>
18. L3.1.1 Existence of a new NAIP/NAFSIP developed through an inclusive and participatory process
19. L3.2.1 Existence of inclusive institutionalized mechanisms for mutual accountability and peer review
20. L3.3.1 Existence of and quality in the implementation of evidence-informed policies and corresponding human resources
21. L3.4.1 Existence of a functional multisectoral and multistakeholder coordination body
22. L3.4.2 Cumulative number of agriculture-related public–private partnerships that are successfully undertaken
23. L3.4.3 Cumulative value of investments in the public–private partnerships
24. L3.5.1 Government agriculture expenditure (billion, constant 2015 US\$)
25. L3.5.2 Government agriculture expenditure (% of total government expenditure)
26. L3.5.3 Government agriculture expenditure (% of agriculture value added)
27. L3.6.2 Existence of an operational country SAKSS
Source: AUC and NPCA (2015). Note: GDP = gross domestic product; NAIP = national agriculture investment plan; NAFSIP = national agriculture and food security investment plan; PPP = purchasing power parity; SAKSS = Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System. Highlighted indicators are also Biennial Review indicators.

We first discuss CAADP implementation at the country and regional levels in terms of progress in developing evidence-based, Malabo-compliant national agriculture investment plans (NAIPs) and operationalizing CAADP mutual accountability processes to support agriculture sector review and dialogue through agriculture joint sector reviews (JSRs) and the CAADP BR. The CAADP implementation process is led by AUC and AUDA-NEPAD working in collaboration with national governments, RECs, nonstate actors, and development and technical partners. We discuss general progress in the implementation process while highlighting the contribution of ReSAKSS as a technical partner.

## *Progress in CAADP Implementation Processes*

### *Implementation Support*

CAADP implementation is largely realized at the country and regional levels through four main phases: (1) domestication of the Malabo Declaration; (2) development of a Malabo-compliant NAIP and regional agriculture investment plan (RAIP); (3) implementation of the NAIP and RAIP; and (4) assessment of NAIP and RAIP implementation progress through, respectively, a national agriculture JSR and a regional agriculture JSR. At the country level, domestication of the Malabo Declaration begins with an event led by AUC, AUDA-NEPAD, and RECs that convenes national CAADP constituencies to discuss and agree on a country roadmap to review and revise the NAIP. The roadmap specifies roles, timelines, and coordination modalities needed to generate a NAIP that receives broad support from national stakeholders. To date, domestication events have been held in 25 countries (Table L3(a) in Annex 3d).

Following the domestication event, countries update their existing NAIP or develop a new NAIP that is expected to go through an AUC-led independent technical review to assess whether it is Malabo compliant, that is, aligned with Malabo goals and targets. A total of 45 African countries have drafted, reviewed, and/or validated a Malabo-compliant NAIP (Table L3(a)). Only three RECs have developed first-generation RAIPs. However, not all of the NAIPs were developed through an AU-sponsored Malabo domestication process or were subject to an AU-led independent technical review to assess their compliance with the Malabo Declaration (Collins et al. 2022). A 2022 consultative dialogue held by AUC and AUDA-NEPAD identified several key constraints to NAIP and RAIP implementation, including technical capacity constraints in policy planning

and implementation, economic and policy analysis, and M&E as well as insufficient multisectoral coordination and lack of policy coherence (AUDA-NEPAD 2022). Notably, the post-Malabo CAADP agenda included a TWG that focused on assessing CAADP implementation and coordination capacity issues. Recommendations of the TWG are expected to guide how to strengthen the implementation of NAIPs and RAIPs under a new 10-year CAADP agenda.

Mutual accountability is a core principle of CAADP that is operationalized through agriculture JSRs and the CAADP BR. JSRs provide an inclusive, evidence-based platform for multiple stakeholders to jointly review progress; hold each other accountable for actions, results, and commitments; and based on gaps identified, agree on future implementation actions. At the request of AUC and AUDA-NEPAD, ReSAKSS has been strengthening agriculture JSRs since 2014. ReSAKSS has, to date, conducted agriculture JSR assessments in 23 countries (Table L3(a)). In addition, at the regional level, ReSAKSS conducted JSR assessments for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 2015 and for the East African Community (EAC) in 2019. The assessments evaluate the institutional and policy landscape as well as the quality of current agricultural review processes, identifying areas that need strengthening in order to help countries and RECs develop JSR processes that are regular, comprehensive, and inclusive. ReSAKSS and its partners have used outcomes of the assessments to strengthen agriculture JSR processes where they exist (for example, in Ghana and Malawi) and establish new JSRs (for instance, in Senegal and Burkina Faso).

Following the JSR assessments and the implementation of JSR best practices and action plans to improve the quality of the agriculture JSRs, several major improvements have ensued. They include the improvement of accountability standards and the strengthening of multistakeholder engagement. We also observe an increase in the active inclusion and participation of nonstate actors, such as farmer-based organizations and civil society organizations, in JSR national meetings (Ulimwengu et al. 2020). Finally, the JSRs have sparked multistakeholder discussions on the need to direct public projects and resources away from areas with a significant presence of nongovernmental organizations performing similar tasks and thus avoid unnecessary duplication of efforts (Matchaya et al. 2022).



## Biennial Review

In the Malabo Declaration, the AU Member States agreed to report, on a biennial basis, their progress in achieving the declaration's seven commitments. Seven thematic areas of performance have been translated from the seven commitments to evaluate country performances. In 2018, 2020, 2022, and 2024, AUC released, respectively, the inaugural, the second, the third, and the fourth BR reports and the corresponding AATs in order to assess performance in implementing the Malabo Declaration.

During the inaugural BR, for the seven thematic areas of performance, 23 performance categories and 43 performance indicators were defined for monitoring and reporting on the Malabo Declaration goals and targets. The number of performance categories increased to 24 and that of performance indicators to 47 at the time of the second (2020) and the third (2022) BR reportings. In the fourth (2024) BR reporting, the number of performance categories increased further to 29 while 12 more indicators were added, bringing the number of performance indicators to 59.

The CAADP BR process promotes mutual accountability by reviewing country performance in progressing toward meeting the Malabo Declaration commitments by 2025. Along with other technical partners, ReSAKSS supports the BR process by helping to improve the BR technical guidelines and tools, including introducing the digital BR (eBR) data entry platform and the BR country reporting profile; training country and regional BR teams on the guidelines and tools; and supporting countries and RECs with data analysis, reporting, cleaning, and validation. For the fourth BR, 49 out of 55 AU Member States submitted country BR reports, compared with 51, 49, and 47 during the third, second, and inaugural BRs, respectively (Table L3(a)).

Africa's performance over the four BR cycles shows that the continent has been consistently off track for meeting the Malabo goals and targets by 2025. In the inaugural BR, the overall score for Africa was 3.6 out of 10, which increased to 4.03 during the second BR. But Africa was below the minimum scores to be on track, which were 3.94 and 6.66, respectively, in the first and second BRs. In the third and fourth BRs, Africa scored 4.32 and 4.56, respectively. Both scores, however, fell far below the benchmark (minimum) scores of 7.28 during the third BR and 9.29 in the fourth BR cycle. Although the scores were insufficient

for achieving the Malabo goals and targets, it is important to note that the continent improved its scores during each BR cycle.

With regard to each of the commitments, the results show that Africa was on track in four of the seven commitments during the inaugural BR (Table 13.3). In the following three BRs, the continent veered off track in all the commitments. Nonetheless, we note consistent improvement in scores over the whole BR period for commitments 3, 6, and 7, and successive improvements in scores for commitment 4 except for the second BR. On the other hand, Africa's score on commitment 2 consistently worsened throughout the first three BR periods, and did not improve in the fourth. The same was true for commitment 5 beginning with the third BR. Despite being off track, Africa registered improvements in overall scores from the inaugural BR to the fourth BR. Those improvements were not realized in all themes, as other themes were characterized by worsening scores.

Performance among the different country classifications shows that some of the subgroupings were on track during the inaugural BR. Those include eastern Africa, southern Africa, countries with less favorable agriculture conditions and more favorable conditions, and upper-middle-income countries. All of these subgroups were able to surpass the benchmark score of 3.94 out of 10 and, hence, were on track as of the inaugural BR to meet the Malabo goals and targets in 2025. But, beginning with the second BR, none of the different subgroups has

**TABLE 13.3—BR SCORES BY COMMITMENT AND BR CYCLE**

BR Commitments	1st BR (2018)	2nd BR (2020)	3rd BR (2022)	4th BR (2024)
Commitment 1: CAADP processes and values	5.53	7.29	7.28	7.66
Commitment 2: Investment finance in agriculture	3.54	3.46	3.15	3.15
Commitment 3: Ending hunger by 2025	1.82	2.2	2.71	2.9
Commitment 4: Halving poverty by 2025	2.67	1.81	2.69	3.04
Commitment 5: Boosting intra-African trade in agricultural commodities and services	2.45	2.87	2.44	2.23
Commitment 6: Enhancing resilience to climate variability	3.86	4.59	5.71	5.91
Commitment 7: Mutual accountability for results and actions	5.35	5.98	6.26	7.02

Source: AUC (2018, 2020, 2022, 2024).


Note: Green shading represents being on track; red shading means being off track. BR = Biennial Review.

been on track. In addition to Africa as a whole, however, we note consistent improvements in BR scores over the successive BRs among the countries with more favorable agriculture conditions, among lower-middle-income countries, and among the countries that formulated either the second generation of a NAIP (N01) or both a first and second generation NAIP (N11) (Figure 13.1). At the country level, the number of countries that were on track declined from 20 in the first BR to four in the second BR and down to one in the third BR. With a high benchmark score to assess progress in the fourth BR (9.29 out of 10), no country is on track to achieve the Malabo commitments by 2025. However, a number of countries improved their scores during each BR cycle despite not being on track. The fourth BR report shows that 20 out of 49 reporting AU Member States, although not on track, are progressing well toward achieving the Malabo commitments, compared with 15 during the third BR and nine during the second BR (AUC 2024).<sup>2</sup>

Assessments of data quality and the rate of data reporting over the four BR cycles show that Africa needs to do more and better to address those issues. After four rounds of the BR, findings show that data quality, missing values, and other issues continued to be prevalent, although the extent of the problem markedly differs among the reporting countries (see AUC [2024] for a thorough assessment of data quality issues for the fourth BR).

Following the publication of each BR report, ReSAKSS takes part in a critical analysis organized by AUC and AUDA-NEPAD with the objective of learning from the process and improving the quality of data and reporting for the next BR cycle. Such analysis consists of technical review of the indicators, technical guidelines, data collection, data sources, challenges with reporting on the indicators, and so forth. The analyses help to identify challenges with regard to reporting on the indicators and possible remedial measures that need to be taken to address such challenges. The critical analysis of the fourth BR cycle will help improve the fifth BR process, which is the last BR cycle under Malabo.

FIGURE 13.1—BR SCORES FOR IMPLEMENTING MALABO DECLARATION



Moreover, ReSAKSS has prepared several country and regional briefs that distill findings of the BR for country and regional learning events. The briefs show that the BR process has led to an increased agriculture sector investment in Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Niger; the incorporation of BR indicators into national agricultural surveys in Mozambique and Togo; and more inclusive policy dialogues in Malawi and Mozambique (Matchaya et al. 2022). Such findings underscore the value of the CAADP BR process and trigger policy and programmatic adjustments in pursuit of desired Malabo goals and targets.

## Progress on CAADP Indicators

In this section, we examine Africa's performance on 27 of the 38 CAADP RF indicators for which data are available, organized by the three RF levels. Detailed

<sup>2</sup> Progressing well means making relatively good progress toward the benchmark score—for example, in the fourth BR, progressing well meant a country achieved a score of 5 or greater out of 10 but less than the benchmark of 9.29.

data on the 27 indicators are presented in Annexes 1 to 3. The annexes include data on the quantitative indicators at the aggregate level for seven different groupings:

- Africa as a whole
- The AU's five geographic regions—central, eastern, northern, southern, and western
- Five economic categories—low-income countries with less favorable agricultural conditions, low-income countries with more favorable agricultural conditions, mineral-rich low-income countries, lower-middle-income countries, and upper-middle-income countries<sup>3</sup>
- Eight RECs—Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), EAC, Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), ECOWAS, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Southern African Development Community (SADC), and Arab Maghreb Union (UMA)
- By the period during which the country signed the CAADP compact—CC0, CC1, CC2, and CC3<sup>4</sup>
- By the level or stage of CAADP implementation reached by the country by the end of 2015—CL0, CL1, CL2, CL3, and CL4<sup>5</sup>

- By whether the country has formulated a first- or second-generation NAIP—N00, N10, N01, and N11<sup>6</sup>

Annex 4 lists countries in the various geographic, economic, and REC categories; Annex 5 lists the countries in the different groupings for CAADP compact signing or level of implementation reached; and Annex 6 lists countries by NAIP formulation category. Complete information for all categories is provided in Annexes 1 to 3. The discussion here focuses on progress among different geographic groupings, economic categories, RECs, and NAIP categories. Progress is reported over different subperiods, with achievement in the early CAADP subperiod of 2003–2008 compared with achievements in the later subperiods of 2008–2014 and 2014–2023.<sup>7</sup> The discussion in the chapter focuses mainly on progress during the Malabo Declaration period to date, that is, from 2014 to the last year with available data. For all indicators, changes over periods are reported in terms of annual average percentage change.

The discussion of trends and changes in CAADP indicators pertains to country categories or groupings as a whole and not to individual countries within the categories—for example, the measures reported relate, for example, to Africa as a whole, central Africa as a group, ECOWAS members as a group, and groups of countries categorized by their stage of NAIP formulation experience. Presenting the trends by different groups helps to determine how the implications for strengthening or maintaining desirable outcomes or for

3 The five economic categories are exclusive, with countries first classified as low-income, lower-middle-income, and higher-middle-income. Low-income countries are then classified as having more or less favorable agricultural conditions. Then, countries with more favorable agricultural conditions are classified as mineral-rich or not. See Benin, Johnson, and Omilola (2010) for a description of the categorization methodology and the criteria used for classifying countries based on income, favorability of agricultural conditions, and mineral wealth.

4 CC0 = group of countries that have not signed a CAADP compact; CC1 = group of countries that signed the compact in the period 2007 to 2009; CC2 = group of countries that signed the compact between 2010 and 2012; CC3 = group of countries that signed the compact between 2013 and 2015.

5 CL0 = group of countries that have not started the CAADP process or have not yet signed a compact; CL1 = group of countries that have signed a CAADP compact; CL2 = group of countries that have signed a compact and formulated a NAIP; CL3 = group of countries that have signed a compact, formulated a NAIP, and secured one external funding source; CL4 = group of countries that have signed a compact, formulated a NAIP, and secured more than one external funding source. Obtaining funding for NAIPs is an important step in CAADP implementation, as countries that have secured external funding are expected to be better able to implement NAIPs and other agricultural investments (Benin 2016).

6 N00 = group of countries that have neither a first-generation NAIP (NAIP1.0) nor a second-generation NAIP (NAIP2.0); N10 = group of countries that have NAIP1.0 but do not have NAIP2.0; N01 = group of countries that have NAIP2.0 but not NAIP1.0; N11 = group of countries that have both NAIP1.0 and NAIP2.0. A second-generation NAIP refers to a NAIP that takes into account the commitments of the 2014 Malabo Declaration. Thus, a NAIP for a country can be considered second generation even if the country does not have a pre-Malabo Declaration, first-generation NAIP. Such countries are in country category N01.

7 Considering that CAADP was launched in 2003, renewed in 2008, and renewed again in 2014 with the Malabo Declaration, the years 2003, 2008, and 2014 represent important CAADP milestones. Therefore, the post-CAADP subperiods for reporting on progress use overlapping years to reflect that these milestones usually occurred in June in the middle of the year—that is, 2003 to 2008, 2008 to 2014, and 2014 to 2023.



reversing undesirable outcomes under the CAADP process may differ across the continent, without inference of causality.

## CAADP Results Framework Outcome (Level 1) Indicators: Agriculture’s Contribution to Economic Growth and Inclusive Development

### Wealth Creation


The Malabo period has been marked by global crises, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia–Ukraine war, both of which have had a severe impact on Africa’s economies. However, even before the onset of COVID-19 in 2020, economic growth had slowed from its previously robust pace during the early 2000s. During the Malabo period, economic growth fell slightly short of keeping pace with population growth, with a small decline in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of 0.02 percent per year on average (Figure 13.2, Annex Table L1.1.1). This reflects uneven growth among the geographic regions, with annual average declines in GDP per capita of 0.9 percent and 1.7 percent in central and southern Africa, respectively, contrasting with growth of 1.3 percent and 1.4 percent in eastern and northern Africa, respectively. Western Africa, like the continent as a whole, experienced a small annual average decline in GDP per capita during the Malabo period. Growth paths also varied among economic categories: low-income countries with more favorable agricultural conditions showed relatively high increases in GDP per capita of 2.4 percent per year on average, contrasting with annual average declines of 1.0 percent in low-income, mineral-rich countries. Among the NAIP categories, countries with neither a first- nor a second-generation NAIP (N00 countries) fared the worst, with annual average declines of 1.5 percent; N01 and N10 countries saw increases in GDP per capita of greater than 1 percent per year while N11 countries saw smaller annual average increases

of 0.3 percent. Self-selection may explain the difference. In an attempt to boost economic growth, countries with lower GDP growth rates may tend to have more consistent and frequent NAIPs than countries with higher GDP growth rates. A detailed causal analysis is required to explain these trends.

Africa continues to recover after the growth shocks of the past few years. Growth in 2023 was positive and higher than the 2014–2023 period average for nearly all country groupings. A notable exception is low-income, mineral-rich countries, with a large decline of 4.9 percent in 2023 compared with more moderate declines for the Malabo period as a whole. Africa as a whole saw GDP per capita growth in 2023 of 0.9 percent.

The level of GDP per capita in Africa as a whole stood at US\$2,005.90<sup>8</sup> in 2023 (Annex Table L1.1.1), representing growth of around 25 percent since the

**FIGURE 13.2—GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT PER CAPITA, CONSTANT 2015 US\$, ANNUAL AVERAGE PERCENTAGE CHANGE, 2003–2023**



<sup>8</sup> Unless stated otherwise, all dollar amounts in the chapter refer to constant 2015 US dollars.


beginning of the CAADP period in 2003, but very little change since the beginning of the Malabo period. Average incomes vary widely across the continent, with GDP per capita in northern Africa more than twice the continental average and that in central Africa less than half the average. Among NAIP groups, countries with only a first-generation NAIP (N10 countries) have the lowest per capita incomes and countries with neither a first- nor a second-generation NAIP (N00 countries) have the highest. Nearly all N00 countries are either lower-middle-income or upper-middle-income countries, both of which have significantly higher GDP per capita than the other economic groups (despite negative growth in average incomes in upper-middle-income countries during the Malabo period).

A major component of GDP is household consumption expenditure, which measures total spending on goods and services to meet the household's consumption needs. Household consumption expenditure per capita displays similar trends as GDP per capita. During the Malabo period to date, average household consumption expenditure rose from \$1,236.30 in 2014 to \$1,341.10 in 2023, representing a small annual average increase of 0.7 percent (Figure 13.3, Annex Table L1.1.2). Household consumption expenditure increased in all geographic regions during the Malabo period, with the exception of central Africa, which showed a small annual average decrease. The largest growth in consumption expenditure was in western Africa at 3.5 percent per year on average. Patterns in consumption expenditure levels as of 2023 are similar to those for GDP per capita, with the highest spending levels in northern Africa and the lowest in central Africa. Among NAIP groups, countries with a second- but not a first-generation NAIP (N01 countries) have the highest household consumption expenditures, followed by N00 countries, with N10 countries showing the lowest levels (Annex Table L1.1.2).


### Food and Nutrition Security

Improving food and nutrition security has long been a key development goal in Africa and remains an urgent concern in

**FIGURE 13.3—ANNUAL HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE PER CAPITA, CONSTANT 2015 US\$, 2003–2023**



**FIGURE 13.4—PREVALENCE OF UNDERNOURISHMENT, ANNUAL AVERAGE PERCENTAGE CHANGE, 2003–2022**




the current era of frequent crises. The prevalence of undernourishment, which measures the share of the population with caloric intake below the minimum requirement, has risen during the Malabo period, increasing by an average of 3.0 percent per year for the continent as a whole (Figure 13.4, Annex Table L1.2.1). Although the increase was more marked in some areas than others, nearly every country group examined showed increasing undernourishment during the Malabo period. The only exceptions are low-income countries with less favorable agricultural conditions, which showed a very slight decrease in undernourishment of 0.1 percent per year. The largest increases in the prevalence of undernourishment (greater than 4 percent) were seen in lower-middle-income countries and countries with a second-generation but not a first-generation NAIP (N01 countries). By geographic region, undernourishment grew the most in northern and eastern Africa and the least in southern Africa. These increases were in contrast with steady declines in undernourishment in the pre-Malabo period in nearly all country groups. The transition to rising undernourishment has been attributed to a number of factors, including the impacts of climate shocks, such as the 2015–2016 El Niño event that caused severe droughts in eastern and southern Africa; conflict in several areas of the continent that led to reduced food production; and reduced commodity prices that decreased purchasing power in some commodity-exporting countries (FAO 2017; AfDB 2017).

As of 2022, the prevalence of undernourishment was 20.0 percent at the continental level (Annex Table L1.2.1). The highest levels of undernourishment were found in countries with only a first-generation NAIP (35.3 percent) and in central African countries (29.6 percent), while the lowest rates were found in northern African countries (6.5 percent), upper-middle-income countries (9.6 percent), and countries with only a second-generation NAIP (14.2 percent). For Africa as a whole and for most country groupings, levels of undernourishment in 2022 were similar to those at the beginning of the CAADP period in 2003, as the increases during the Malabo period counteracted decreases in the earlier CAADP periods. However, some areas had more substantial declines in undernourishment, including eastern African countries and low-income countries with less favorable agricultural conditions, which showed declines of more than

8 percentage points between 2003 and 2022. In contrast, upper-middle-income countries showed a considerable increase over the entire CAADP period, from 4.9 percent in 2003 to 9.6 percent in 2022.

Like overall undernourishment, child undernourishment assessed through biometric measures remains severe in most of the continent. During the 2014–2022 period, rates of stunting, underweight, and wasting in children under five averaged 31.5 percent, 17.1 percent, and 7.0 percent, respectively (Figure 13.5; Annex Tables L1.2.2A, L1.2.2B, and L1.2.2C). By region, central Africa had the highest rate of stunting and underweight and northern Africa had the lowest. Patterns are somewhat different for wasting, with the highest rates found in western Africa and the lowest in southern Africa. Northern Africa differs from

**FIGURE 13.5—PREVALENCE OF UNDERWEIGHT, STUNTING, AND WASTING IN AFRICA, PERCENTAGE OF CHILDREN YOUNGER THAN FIVE YEARS, 2014–2022 AVERAGE**




other country groupings in that the rate of wasting, at 7.4 percent, exceeded the rate of underweight, at 5.1 percent. In terms of economic groupings, low-income countries with less favorable agricultural conditions and low-income, mineral-rich countries had the highest rates of all three child malnutrition indicators during the Malabo period and upper-middle-income countries had the lowest. Among NAIP groups, N10 countries had the highest rates of stunting and underweight while N01 countries had the highest rates of wasting; N00 countries had the lowest rates of all child malnourishment indicators, reflecting the fact that nearly all N00 countries are upper- or lower-middle-income countries.

The prevalence of child undernourishment remains far above Malabo Declaration targets, which call for reducing the levels of stunting and underweight to 10 percent and 5 percent, respectively, by 2025. However, child stunting, underweight, and wasting have declined consistently during the Malabo period through 2022, avoiding so far the increases seen for the prevalence of undernourishment overall. The small but sustained decrease in child undernutrition despite broader food and nutrition security challenges may be related to the success of nutrition-specific interventions targeted to children, as well as improvements in healthcare and sanitation (IFPRI 2017). For Africa as a whole, rates of stunting, underweight, and wasting among children decreased by 1.5 percent, 1.9 percent, and 1.8 percent per year on average, respectively (Annex Tables L1.2.2A, L1.2.2B, and L1.2.2C). All three measures of child undernourishment decreased in all country groups, with the exception of wasting, which increased slightly in northern Africa and showed no change in upper-middle-income countries and N01 countries. Whereas stunting is an indicator of chronic undernutrition, wasting reflects shorter-term acute undernutrition and is sometimes associated with humanitarian emergencies or other crises. The relatively high rates of wasting in northern Africa are driven by Libya, Mauritania, and Egypt and may be partly related to instability as well as other factors. The future trajectory of child and overall undernourishment in Africa is uncertain, as the longer-term


impacts of food price inflation experienced in many countries following the onset of the Russia–Ukraine war in 2022 remain to be assessed.

The cereal import dependency ratio expresses the share of total cereal supplies (including production and net imports) that are sourced from imports rather than domestic production. Although imports are an important part of countries’ food supplies, a high import dependency ratio can reflect vulnerability to global market shocks. The cereal import dependency ratio for Africa as a whole increased moderately during the pre-Malabo CAADP period but has remained mostly steady during the Malabo period at around 30 percent (Figure 13.6, Annex Table L1.2.3). This represents a medium level of dependence according to the categorization used in the food import vulnerability index (FIVI) developed for the Food Security Portal by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI 2024). Dependency is highest in northern Africa, where it is also on the increase, growing from 53.9 percent in 2014 to 59.8 percent in 2021. Eastern Africa had the lowest dependency ratio throughout the period, but it is also increasing, while in southern Africa dependency fell

**FIGURE 13.6—CEREAL IMPORT DEPENDENCY RATIO, PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL DOMESTIC CEREAL SUPPLY, 2003–2021**



**FIGURE 13.7—EMPLOYMENT RATE, PERCENTAGE OF LABOR FORCE AGES 15 TO 64 YEARS, ANNUAL AVERAGE PERCENTAGE CHANGE, 2003–2023**



throughout the period. As of 2021, all of Africa’s geographic regions fell within the FIVI category of low import dependence, except for northern Africa with a very high import dependence. It should be noted that relatively high cereal import dependency ratios do not necessarily indicate food insecurity, as reflected by the fact that northern Africa has by far the highest import dependency but also the lowest rates of undernourishment and of most forms of child malnutrition (Figures 13.4 and 13.5).

**Employment**

Africa’s employment rate, measured as a share of the labor force aged 15–64 years, declined slightly during the Malabo period at a rate of 0.1 percent per year (Figure 13.7, Annex Table L1.3.1A). Although this decline began prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, it accelerated in 2020 and continued in 2021 before employment began to rise again in 2022 (Collins, Tefera, and Wambo Yamdjeu 2023).

Among the country groups, only northern Africa and N01 countries showed slight increases in employment rates during the Malabo period. All other groups showed declines, with the largest decreases in upper-middle-income countries, N00 countries, low-income countries with less favorable agricultural conditions, and eastern African countries. Employment rebounded in most of these groups with rising rates between 2022 and 2023, especially in upper-middle-income countries and N00 countries, but employment rates in eastern Africa were still declining into 2023.

Employment as a percentage of the population over 15 (Annex Table L1.3.1B) showed broadly similar patterns to those of employment as a percentage of the labor force. All country groups showed declines in employment as a share of population during the Malabo period, including northern Africa and N01 countries, suggesting that the slight increases in employment measured as a share of the labor force in those groups (Figure 13.7) were associated with decreases in the size of the labor force as a share of the population.

In 2023, the employment rate as a share of the labor force was 90.6 percent in Africa as a whole (Annex Table L1.3.1A). Among geographic groups, western Africa had the highest rate (93.7 percent) and southern Africa the lowest (82.8 percent). When measured as a share of the entire population 15 and over, Africa’s employment rate was recorded at 58.5 percent in 2023, with significant differences across geographic regions (Annex Table L1.3.1B). Eastern and central Africa had the highest employment rates of 68.2 percent and 63.9 percent, respectively, while northern Africa had by far the lowest rate of 39.7 percent. The difference between the two employment rates reflects differences in the labor force of each region as a share of the population. Among economic groups, low-income countries with more favorable agricultural conditions have the highest employment rates, both as a share of the labor force and of the population, likely reflecting the dominance of agriculture as a source of employment in Africa.

**Poverty**

Reducing poverty in Africa is a key goal of the Malabo Declaration as well as



Agenda 2063 and other development frameworks. Poverty has fallen throughout the CAADP period, although progress has been uneven and has slowed during the Malabo period compared with earlier years. The poverty headcount ratio at the international poverty line of USPPP\$2.15 (2017 purchasing power parity [PPP]) decreased modestly during the Malabo period at an annual average of 0.6 percent (Annex Table L1.3.4). As of 2021, the last year for which data are available, the poverty headcount ratio stood at 30.0 percent for Africa as a whole—a significant decrease from 2003’s 41.2 percent, but only a slight decrease from the 2014 level of 31.7 percent. Eastern, southern, and central Africa had poverty rates above the continental average; poverty in western Africa was slightly below the continental average, with the lowest poverty rate of 0.8 percent in northern Africa. Among economic groups, mineral-rich countries had by far the highest poverty rate of 64.3 percent in 2021, with the lowest rates in lower- and upper-middle-income countries (Annex Table L1.3.4). Among the NAIP categories, N10 countries had the highest poverty (62.1 percent) and N01 countries had the lowest (15.6 percent).


Whereas the poverty headcount ratio measures the total share of the population under the international poverty line, the poverty gap (Annex Table L1.3.3) measures the average percentage distance below the poverty line for the entire population, serving as an indicator of both the incidence of poverty and the severity of poverty. As of 2021, the poverty gap was 10.5 percent for the continent as a whole, with higher rates in eastern and southern Africa of 15.8 percent in both regions, followed by central Africa; the poverty gap was the lowest by far in northern Africa at 0.2 percent. Eastern and southern Africa were also the only two geographic regions in which the poverty gap increased during the Malabo period. Among economic groupings, the poverty gap was by far the highest in low-income, mineral-rich countries, at 31.0 percent, and lowest in upper- and lower-middle-income countries. Among NAIP groups, the poverty gap was highest in countries that had developed a first-generation but not a second-generation NAIP.

## CAADP Results Framework Output (Level 2) Indicators: Agricultural Transformation and Sustained Inclusive Agricultural Growth


### *Agricultural Production and Productivity*

Looking at its contribution to employment, GDP, external trade, and food

**FIGURE 13.8—AGRICULTURE VALUE ADDED (CONSTANT 2015 US\$, BILLION)—AFRICA**



**FIGURE 13.9—AFRICAN AGRICULTURE, AVERAGE ANNUAL VALUE ADDED, US\$ BILLIONS (CONSTANT 2015 US\$), BY TIME PERIOD AND GEOGRAPHIC REGION**




security, agriculture is the most critical sector in Africa and plays a significant role in the countries of the continent. The last two decades saw improvement in the agriculture sector, although there were differences in performance at the regional and country levels. For Africa as a whole, agriculture value added almost doubled during the CAADP period. It increased from \$235.4 billion in 2003 to \$437.3 billion in 2023 (Figure 13.8).

Viewed from a regional perspective, the western Africa region held the highest agriculture value added during the whole CAADP period with a share of 42 percent of the value added in Africa during the Malabo period (2014–2023). This shows that western Africa is the major contributor of agriculture value added in the continent. This is followed by eastern Africa and northern Africa at 22.8 percent and 22.4 percent, respectively. The shares for southern and central Africa are smaller at 7.4 percent and 5.4 percent, respectively, for the same period. Figure 13.9 shows that all geographic regions recorded consistent increases in agriculture value added during the CAADP subperiods.

For Africa as a whole, agriculture value added recorded positive growth throughout the CAADP period. But growth during the Malabo period was higher than during the Maputo period. That is, value added grew at 2.57 percent and 2.41 percent during the 2003–2008 and 2008–2014 periods, respectively, before jumping to 3.46 annual average growth during 2014–2023. Except for the mineral-rich countries and upper-middle-income countries that recorded negative growth rates in agriculture value added, all of the other country subgroups produced positive growth rates over the whole CAADP subperiods. Higher growth rates were recorded by the countries with more favorable agriculture conditions, although the growth rate slowed down in the recent subperiods. A similar pattern was also observed in the countries with less favorable agriculture conditions (Figure 13.10). None of the different subgroups was able to meet the 6 percent CAADP target during the Malabo period (2014–2023).

Some nine countries managed to record an annual average growth rate of more than the CAADP 6 percent target during the 2014–2023 period, including Guinea, Niger, Ethiopia, Senegal, Rwanda, Seychelles, Gabon, Kenya, and Gambia. Of those, only Ethiopia and Rwanda managed to surpass the 6 percent CAADP target during 2008–2014. Another six countries—Angola, Algeria,


**FIGURE 13.10—AGRICULTURE VALUE ADDED, ANNUAL AVERAGE GROWTH, PERCENTAGE, 2003–2023**



Mali, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania—were able to meet the CAADP 6 percent target in that subperiod but then saw their annual average growth decelerate in the Malabo period (Figure 13.11).

Sustainable labor and land productivity are central to the continuous growth of the agriculture sector. Such developments have several implications including for food price stability, improving food security, and also reducing poverty and malnutrition among rural households. Measured by agriculture value added per worker, *agricultural labor productivity* in Africa increased from an annual average of \$1,410.1 recorded during the initial CAADP subperiod (2003–2008) to \$1,554.8 in 2008–2014 and further up to a yearly average of \$1,769.6 during the Malabo period (2014–2023). Similar increasing trends were observed in almost all of the subgroups despite notable variation (Annex Table L2.1.3). That is, labor productivity remained the highest in northern Africa followed by the lower-middle-income countries, while it was the least in central

**FIGURE 13.11—NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL VALUE ADDED, ANNUAL AVERAGE GROWTH, PERCENTAGE, BY TIME PERIOD**



Africa and the group of countries that have formulated a first-generation NAIP only (N10).

*Land productivity*, measured by agriculture value added per hectare of arable land, consistently increased for Africa as well as for the different subgroups. For Africa as a whole, land productivity increased from an annual average of \$232.6 in 2003–2008 to annual averages of \$282.1 and \$356.5 in 2008–2014 and 2014–2023, respectively. The subgroups that recorded the highest land productivity are northern Africa, western Africa, and the lower-middle-income countries, recording more than \$600 on average per annum during the Malabo period (2014–2023). On the other hand, agriculture land productivity remained the least in southern Africa and the upper-middle-income countries, recording an annual average of less than \$100 throughout the whole CAADP period (Annex Table L2.1.4).


Cassava, yam, maize, cattle meat, and cow milk are the five major agricultural commodities in Africa, accounting for 28.9 percent of the continent’s total agriculture production during 2003–2022. As shown in Annex Tables L2.1.5A, L2.1.5B, L2.1.5C, L2.1.5D, and L2.1.5E, growth for these major agriculture commodities has not been uniform over the CAADP subperiods. Except for maize, which exhibited a positive growth rate consistently throughout the different CAADP subperiods, the commodities recorded a positive annual average rate of growth in one subperiod and a negative growth rate in the other. For Africa as a whole, the annual average yield for cassava, yam, and maize was 8.3, 8.7, and 2.1 metric tons per hectare during the Malabo period (2014–2022). For the same period, yield for meat and milk was 159 and 556.4 kilograms

per head. Africa’s yield levels are much lower than those of other regions of the world. According to FAOSTAT (FAO 2024), the annual average yield in Asia for the period 2014–2022 was 21.6, 18.5, and 5.4 metric tons per hectare for cassava, yam, and maize, respectively. Such performance in other regions shows that Africa is far behind and must improve yields for its priority commodities. The trend in yield for the whole CAADP period is shown in Figure 13.12.

***Intra-African Agricultural Trade***


Africa saw a continuous increase in intra-African agricultural trade throughout the CAADP period. *Intra-African agricultural exports* grew from an annual average of \$6.4 billion in 2003–2008 to \$11.6 billion in 2008–2014 and further

**FIGURE 13.12—YIELD FOR THE FIVE MAJOR COMMODITIES FOR AFRICA, 2003–2022**



Source: ReSAKSS based on FAO (2024).

**FIGURE 13.13—INTRA-AFRICAN AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS, CONSTANT 2015 US\$ BILLIONS, BY TIME PERIOD AND COUNTRY GROUPING**




Source: ReSAKSS based on UNCTAD (2024) and World Bank (2024).

to \$14.8 billion during 2014–2023. By 2023, intra-African agricultural exports had reached \$17.6 billion (Annex Table L2.2.1A). The performance recorded during the Malabo period was far behind the commitment to triple intra-African trade in agricultural commodities and services by 2025. Between 2014 and 2023, Africa as a whole was able to increase intra-African trade by 36.2 percent only, far less than the commitment made in 2014 to boost trade. The successive BRs also show that since the second BR Africa has been off track in meeting the Malabo goal of boosting intra-African trade in agricultural commodities and services by 2025 (see Table 13.3). From the perspective of country groups, the results show that intra-African agricultural exports are dominated by southern Africa, lower-middle-income countries, and the countries that have formulated both generations of NAIPs (N11).

As Figure 13.13 shows, almost all of the country subgroups exhibited increases in intra-African agricultural exports during the successive subperiods. Exceptions were central Africa and the group of countries that have formulated a first-generation NAIP only (N10), which recorded a decline during the Malabo period (2014–2023) compared with the earlier period. Intra-African agricultural exports are notably dominated by a few countries on the continent. Between 2014 and 2023, South Africa alone accounted for 25.8 percent of the trade, followed by Egypt (8 percent) and Uganda (6.2 percent). Those three countries accounted for 40 percent of total intra-African agricultural exports during the Malabo period.

For the different subgroups, intra-African agricultural imports improved during the CAADP period. For Africa as a whole, they increased from an annual average level of \$7.9 billion recorded during the early CAADP subperiod (2003–2008) to \$11.9 billion and \$14.9 billion in 2008–2014 and 2014–2023, respectively (Annex Table L2.2.1B). As Figure 13.14 reveals, dominant players in intra-African agricultural imports are the southern Africa region, the lower-middle-income countries, and the group of countries that have embarked on both the first and second generations of NAIPs (N11).

**FIGURE 13.14—INTRA-AFRICAN AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS, CONSTANT 2015 US\$ BILLIONS, BY TIME PERIOD AND COUNTRY GROUPING**



Despite observed improvements in imports within Africa, studies show that Africa remains a net importer of agricultural goods with total imports of around \$80 billion (FAO and AUC 2021). This implies that the share of intra-African imports in the total import bill is around 20 percent. Moreover, the growth in imports from the rest of the world is faster than the growth in intra-African imports in recent periods (Olivetti et al. 2023). Furthermore, intra-African agricultural trade imports are dominated by a few countries, mainly the countries in the southern Africa region. Of the 10 leading countries in intra-African agricultural trade, five are from southern Africa. The leading five countries during the Malabo period were South Africa (7.1 percent), Egypt (5.2 percent), Namibia (5.2 percent), Botswana (4.8 percent), and Zimbabwe (4.7 percent).

## CAADP Results Framework Input (Level 3) Indicators: Strengthening Systemic Capacity to Deliver Results

### *Capacities for Agriculture and Food Security Policy Design and Implementation*

Progress in the implementation of actions to strengthen systemic capacity for agriculture and food-security policy planning and implementation under CAADP is presented in Annex Table L3(b). Accomplishments as of September 2024 were as follows:

- 45 countries had formulated new or revised second-generation NAIPs through inclusive and participatory processes;
- 28 countries had inclusive institutionalized mechanisms for mutual accountability and peer review—mainly JSRs;
- 36 countries were implementing evidence-based policies;
- 31 countries had functional multisectoral and multistakeholder coordination bodies—mainly agricultural sector working groups; and
- 22 countries had successfully undertaken agriculture-related public-private partnerships to boost specific agricultural value chains.

These figures are based on countries' self-reporting or the assessment of country experts. Determining the values for several of these measures required subjective judgments on the quality of capacities and processes, so they may be subject to change.

### *Government Expenditure on Agriculture*

Agriculture is the leading economic sector in most countries in Africa in terms of its contribution to national GDP; it has many backward and forward linkages with other sectors such as manufacturing and service. It contributes significantly to employment and foreign exchange earnings through cross-border trade. In the majority of countries, the sector contributes significantly to overall economic growth. Public spending in the sector is critical for providing public goods and services that support development and growth of the sector and for crowding in essential private sector investment. In recognition of the importance of



public expenditure in agriculture, the CAADP framework set a target of 10 percent of total government spending to be allocated to the agriculture sector annually. In level terms, average annual government agriculture expenditure increased from \$13.3 billion on average between 2003 and 2008 to \$14.5 billion between 2008 and 2014 to \$17.5 billion in the period from 2014 to 2023.


A breakdown of government agriculture expenditure by country subgroup shows notable variation in the level of such spending. Among countries classified by income, middle-income countries accounted for 62.3 percent of total public spending on agriculture in Africa between 2014 and 2023. For the same period, the highest share of government spending on agriculture, 62 percent, occurred in the group of countries that had formulated both generations of NAIP (N11).

Growth in government agriculture expenditure in Africa was the highest in the early CAADP period but declined in subsequent subperiods. The average annual growth rate in government agriculture spending was 5.3 percent between 2003 and 2008 but declined to 1.5 percent between 2008 and 2014 and fell further to a growth rate of just 0.4 percent between 2014 and 2023. As Figure 13.15 shows, a similar downward trend is observed for most of the country subgroups, particularly during the 2014–2023 subperiod.

The share of government agriculture expenditure in total government spending remained modest over the last two decades. For Africa as a whole, the share was 3.6 percent on average between 2003 and 2008 before declining to 2.6 percent for the 2008–2014 period and then improving moderately between 2014 and 2023, reaching 2.8 percent.

Marked differences in the share of agriculture expenditure in total government expenditure were seen among country subgroups during the review period (Annex Table L.3.5.2).


**FIGURE 13.15—GOVERNMENT AGRICULTURE EXPENDITURE, AVERAGE ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGE, 2003–2023**



Source: ReSAKSS based on IFPRI (2019), World Bank (2024), and national government sources.

Note: N00, N01, N10, and N11 categories refer to the presence or absence of first- and second-generation national agriculture investment plans (see footnote 6).

**FIGURE 13.16—SHARE OF GOVERNMENT AGRICULTURE EXPENDITURE IN TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE, PERCENTAGE, 2008–2023, BY COUNTRY**




Source: ReSAKSS based on IFPRI (2019), World Bank (2024), and national government sources.

The highest share was observed among the lower-income countries with less favorable agricultural conditions and the lower-income countries with more favorable agricultural conditions in all three subperiods. Among geographic regions, eastern Africa had on average the highest share of total government expenditure made up by agriculture expenditure.

At the country level, agriculture expenditure as a share of total government spending varied notably across Africa, with very few countries consistently allocating a high share of total public spending to agriculture (Figure 13.16). Only Ethiopia and Malawi consistently met the CAADP 10 percent budget target throughout the 2008–2023 period. The performance of other countries was much less consistent over time. Madagascar and Mali met the 10 percent CAADP target for the 2008–2014 period. Sierra Leone and Benin achieved the 10 percent budget target during the 2014–2023 period. For the same period, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Sudan allocated more than 9 percent of their public spending to agriculture, close to the CAADP 10 percent budget target. Overall, the low level of public investment in agriculture is a challenge that countries need to address. Given its critical role in spurring economic growth, reducing poverty, and ensuring food security and employment, public investment in agriculture needs to be increased.

The intensity of government spending in agriculture proxied by the ratio of government agriculture expenditure relative to agricultural GDP (i.e., agriculture value added) has recorded a marginal decline over the 2003–2023 period. From a continental perspective, Africa’s agriculture spending as a share of agriculture GDP averaged 5.3 percent for the 2003–2008 period, 4.8 percent between 2008 and 2014, and 4.6 percent between 2014 and 2023 (Figure 13.17). The performance for country subgroups was mixed—some groups showed an increasing trend while a declining trend was observed for a few others (Annex Table L.3.5.3). Over the review period, public spending on agriculture relative to the size of the country’s agriculture sector was the highest for upper-middle-income countries and the southern Africa region followed by the group of countries that are yet to embark on a NAIP (N00).

**FIGURE 13.17—GOVERNMENT AGRICULTURE EXPENDITURE AS A SHARE OF AGRICULTURE VALUE ADDED, AVERAGE, PERCENTAGE, 2003–2022**



## Conclusion

As this chapter shows, the continent has made limited progress in advancing CAADP implementation, particularly in achieving CAADP BR goals and targets. For example, of the 49 AU Member States that participated in the fourth BR in 2023, not a single country is on track to achieve the Malabo commitments by 2025. Therefore, going into the next decade of CAADP, concerted effort is required to strengthen CAADP implementation capacities at the country and regional levels, including through embedding NAIPs in country-planning and country-budgeting cycles and enhancing interministerial and intercountry coordination.

The review of progress also demonstrates that although Africa has made important progress over the CAADP period in many areas, the pace of progress

decelerated significantly during the Malabo Declaration period for several key development goals. For example, average incomes have changed very little from their 2014 levels, and poverty has declined only slightly. Progress in reducing hunger has been mixed, as child malnutrition has shown small but steady declines, but undernourishment among the population at large has increased during the Malabo period. Although the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and the onset of the Russia–Ukraine war in 2022 have presented severe challenges, progress toward many of the CAADP and Malabo goals had already slowed prior to those shocks. In the coming years, the continent will need to both sustain the recovery from recent crises and recapture the growth momentum of the earlier CAADP period.

The CAADP period saw Africa make steady progress in improving agriculture value added and labor and land productivity. For the sector to contribute more toward addressing food insecurity, malnutrition, rural unemployment, and so forth, agricultural productivity needs to increase substantially together with improved supporting and enabling infrastructure across the whole value chain.

Africa needs to do more and better in improving trade within the continent. The introduction of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement is one of the major policy reforms adopted at the continental level that can be leveraged. In this regard, Africa should address tariff and nontariff barriers as well as improve trade facilitation measures to spur intracontinental trade. This has the potential to substantially increase such trade from the current 20 percent level. Leveraging AfCFTA will bring new trade opportunities, and the continent can gain from export diversification including agro-processing of food products.

Very few countries have met the CAADP target to spend at least 10 percent of total public expenditure on the agriculture sector. In addition, agriculture spending relative to agriculture GDP is low and has been declining since 2003. Public expenditure is essential for unlocking the sector's potential, driving productivity growth, and reducing poverty. Since public resources are limited, it is also critical to efficiently allocate available resources to the subsectors with the highest productivity growth potential and poverty reduction effects. Therefore, the generation and use of evidence in formulating strategies and programs is important to inform prioritization and resource allocation. Strengthening and deepening national-level accountability mechanisms such as the joint sector reviews is essential for monitoring policy implementation, learning, and

reviewing. Effective JSRs must be underpinned by strong data management systems and strong in-country analytical capacities that are connected to policy-making processes.

The review of progress we present in this chapter has highlighted the significant variation in Africa's performance across years and across country groups in terms of geographic region, economic characteristics, and engagement in the CAADP process. A detailed examination of the factors contributing to diverging performance is beyond the scope of this chapter. Previous analyses of CAADP's impacts on Africa's development goals have shown both positive and mixed effects. For example, Benin (2016) found that CAADP had a positive impact on agricultural production and productivity growth, but mixed or limited impacts on other outcome areas. Ulimwengu, Tefera, and Wambo Yamdjeu (2023) found that whereas commitment to CAADP principles and values and progress in CAADP implementation had positive impacts in several areas, such efforts did not consistently contribute to positive outcomes, likely due in part to the complex effects of policies in different country contexts and the impacts of recent global and local shocks. As Africa embarks on the post-Malabo era, there is an evident need for further detailed causal analyses to explain past trends and guide the next phase of CAADP implementation.